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SLOUCHING TOWARDS MONELL: THE 
DISAPPEARANCE OF VICARIOUS LIABILITY 
UNDER SECTION 10(B)  
 ANN M. LIPTON
  
 
ABSTRACT 
Liability under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act is one of 
the primary mechanisms for enforcing the federal securities laws. Section 
10(b), however, prohibits only intentional or reckless deception, and there 
has never been consensus as to how to determine whether an organization, 
rather than a natural person, harbors the relevant mens rea. Traditionally, 
organizational liability under federal law is determined according to 
agency principles, and most courts pay lip service to the notion that 
agency principles govern under section 10(b). As this Article 
demonstrates, they do not.  
Many section 10(b) actions involve “open-market” frauds, whereby the 
allegedly fraudulent statements are issued publicly under the corporate 
imprimatur. These statements depend on agents operating at all levels of 
the company, who may intentionally or recklessly pass along inaccurate 
information through corporate reporting channels. In such circumstances, 
the actus reus that forms the basis of the section 10(b) violation—the false 
public statement—has been disaggregated from the actor who harbors 
mens rea. As this Article shows, courts have used this disaggregation to 
eschew the agency principles applied in other areas of law. Courts instead 
seek to impose a form of “direct” organizational liability tied to the 
actions and omissions of the organization’s highest-level authorities. This 
regime is, in practical effect, strikingly similar to the regime used to 
determine the liability of local governments under § 1983, where vicarious 
liability has been formally rejected by the Supreme Court.  
Though these two statutes would seem to have little in common, this 
Article argues that vicarious liability has been rejected under both 
regimes for similar policy reasons. Among other things, as federal 
corporate disclosure requirements—backed by the threat of section 10(b) 
liability—expand into a mechanism for substantively regulating the quality 
 
 
  Associate Professor, Tulane University Law School. Many thanks to Jim Cox, Joseph 
Blocher, Rachel Brewster, Sam Buell, Toby Heytens, Deborah DeMott, Darrell Miller, Hillary Sale, 
Rebecca Tushnet, and all of the participants in the Duke Faculty Workshop. 
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of corporate governance (a matter traditionally left to state law), courts 
have pushed back by limiting vicarious liability in order to distinguish 
“true” fraud claims from garden-variety mismanagement. Similarly, in the 
§ 1983 context, the elimination of vicarious municipal liability functions, 
as a practical matter, to distinguish matters of federal constitutional 
concern from ordinary state law torts. 
This Article ultimately concludes that, despite the criticisms that have 
been leveled at the current approaches to organizational liability under 
§ 1983, § 1983 doctrine may in fact improve jurisprudence under 
section 10(b). Courts considering section 10(b) claims may borrow from 
jurisprudence developed under § 1983 to formulate objective standards of 
fault, in order to prevent high-level corporate authorities from insulating 
themselves from knowledge of wrongdoing at lower levels of the corporate 
hierarchy. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Securities fraud liability—and in particular, liability under section 
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
1—is one of the primary 
mechanisms for enforcing the disclosure obligations imposed upon 
publicly traded corporations under the federal securities laws. Nonetheless, 
despite the long history of securities fraud litigation under section 10(b), 
courts have yet to announce a uniform standard for determining liability 
when the defendant is an organization. The sticking point is organizational 
mens rea: Professor Donald Langevoort recently described corporate 
scienter as “one of the greatly under-theorized subjects in all of securities 
litigation“2  
Yet despite courts’ failure to formally endorse a coherent standard for 
attributing mens rea to an organization, this Article demonstrates that the 
situation is less indeterminate than has been previously acknowledged. It 
turns out that when evaluating section 10(b) claims, courts increasingly 
seek to identify organizational “fault” in a manner that is strikingly similar 
to the regime that is used to determine the liability of local governments 
under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Though these two 
statutes would seem to have little in common, and the case law under each 
has developed independently of the other, this Article shows that similar 
policy considerations have driven courts to eschew vicarious liability in 
both contexts, in favor of developing a form of “direct” organizational 
liability tied to the actions and omissions of the organization’s highest-
level authorities. 
The story begins with the changing nature of the section 10(b) cause of 
action. The statute prohibits any person from engaging in manipulative or 
deceptive conduct in connection with securities transactions,
3
 and requires 
proof that the defendant acted with “scienter”—either an “intent to 
deceive, manipulate, or defraud,”4 or reckless indifference to the “‘danger 
of misleading buyers or sellers’”5 Because the Exchange Act explicitly 
provides that organizations, as well as natural persons, can violate 
 
 
 1. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012). 
 2. Donald C. Langevoort, Lies Without Liars? Janus Capital and Conservative Securities 
Jurisprudence, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 933, 959 (2013).  
 3. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b); see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2014). 
 4. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976). 
 5. Southland Sec. Corp. v. INSpire Ins. Solutions Inc., 365 F.3d 353, 366 (5th Cir. 2004) 
(quoting Broad v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 642 F.2d 929, 962 (5th cir. 1981)).  
Washington University Open Scholarship
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section 10(b),
6
 courts must create rules for determining the “scienter” of an 
organizational defendant.  
Traditionally, under federal law, mens rea is imputed to organizations 
via agency principles, such as respondeat superior. Because the earliest 
claims against organizational defendants under section 10(b) involved 
face-to-face frauds—corrupt brokers, for example, were common—they 
presented easy cases.
7
 The fraudster, acting in his capacity as an employee, 
personally violated section 10(b), justifying strict liability for his 
employer. Over time, however, brokerage claims moved out of public 
view and into arbitration.
8
 Simultaneously, courts began to entertain cases 
involving “open-market” frauds, whereby a publicly traded corporation is 
alleged to have issued false statements about the quality of its business. In 
such circumstances, courts would presume that the false statements 
affected the market price of the corporation’s securities, thereby damaging 
investors who had traded at that price.
9
 This legal theory, known as the 
fraud-on-the-market doctrine, left the corporation potentially liable to the 
entire marketplace of traders. It also radically altered the nature of the 
section 10(b) action with two significant consequences.  
First, it allowed for disaggregation between the employee who 
committed the actus reus—the corporate official who issued the false 
statement—and the employee harboring the mens rea. This necessarily 
presented the question of which actors’ mental states could be imputed to 
the corporation. Statements issued under the corporate imprimatur often 
have multiple anonymous authors, and include information supplied by 
employees scattered throughout the company. Any of these employees, or 
combinations of them, or business segments, may intentionally filter false 
information up through corporate reporting channels without the 
knowledge of the top officers. 
Second, the extension of liability to open-market frauds exponentially 
expanded the number of potential plaintiffs damaged by a single 
fraudulent act, and the fraud-on-the-market doctrine facilitated the 
 
 
 6. As originally drafted, the statute defined a “person” to mean “an individual, a corporation, a 
partnership, an association, a joint-stock company, a business trust, or an unincorporated 
organization.” Brown v. Covington, 805 F.2d 1266, 1268 (6th Cir. 1986). In 1975, it was amended to 
define a “person” to mean “a natural person, company, government, or political subdivision, agency, 
or instrumentality of a government.” 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(9) (2012). 
 7. See, e.g., Commerford v. Olson, 794 F.2d 1319 (8th Cir. 1986); Paul F. Newton & Co. v. 
Tex. Commerce Bank, 630 F.2d 1111 (5th Cir. 1980); Marbury Mgmt., Inc. v. Kohn, 629 F.2d 705 (2d 
Cir. 1980); Carras v. Burns, 516 F.2d 251 (4th Cir. 1975). 
 8. See Barbara Black & Jill I. Gross, Making It up as They Go Along: The Role of Law in 
Securities Arbitration, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 991, 991–92 (2002). 
 9. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss5/7
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certification of classes of those plaintiffs, thus dramatically increasing 
corporations’ damages exposure. With this change, the purpose of the 
section 10(b) was transformed. No longer is “compensation” for defrauded 
investors a realistic or achievable goal;
10
 instead, section 10(b) actions—at 
least those based on open-market purchases—are now justified as a 
deterrent mechanism to protect the integrity of corporate 
communications.
11
 But this justification extends section 10(b) far beyond 
the mere confines of fraud prevention, because corporate communications 
today serve broader purposes. Disclosure enhances internal corporate 
governance by, among other things, enforcing a duty of care on corporate 
managers and facilitating shareholders’ ability to monitor managers’ 
conduct.
12
 Disclosure also has macroeconomic effects: Regulators make 
policy based on their understanding of how businesses operate; lenders 
extend credit based on their perception of the stability of the borrower; 
competitors change business strategies based on reports of their rivals; 
symbiotic industries make business plans based on their expectations of 
future dealings with customers and suppliers; employees choose where to 
invest their skills based on perceived demand.
13
 All of these areas of 
economic activity depend on the accuracy and reliability of public 
corporate communications, yet the persons and institutions affected have 
few, if any, avenues for relief when those communications prove false. 
Thus, the securities laws—and in particular, the private section 10(b) 
cause of action—bear the practical responsibility of protecting these varied 
interests, despite the rather distant relationship between section 10(b) 
plaintiffs and the wide variety of persons injured by false public 
statements.  
As a result, section 10(b) has shifted from a mechanism for making 
defrauded investors whole to a mechanism for representing the varied 
 
 
 10. See, e.g., William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Political Economy of Fraud on the 
Market, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 69, 99–100 (2011); Merritt B. Fox, Why Civil Liability for Disclosure 
Violations When Issuers Do Not Trade?, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 297, 302–09; John C. Coffee, Jr., 
Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on Deterrence and its Implementation, 106 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1534, 1545–47 (2006); Amanda M. Rose, Reforming Securities Litigation Reform: 
Restructuring the Relationship Between Public and Private Enforcement of Rule 10b-5, 108 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1301, 1309 (2008). But see Elliott J. Weiss, The Lead Plaintiff Provisions of the PSLRA After 
a Decade, or “Look What’s Happened to My Baby,” 61 VAND. L. REV. 543, 558 (2008) (arguing that 
compensation is achieved more often than previously thought). 
 11. James D. Cox, The Social Meaning of Shareholder Suits, 65 BROOK. L. REV. 3, 4 (1999); 
Fox, supra note 10, at 318–32. 
 12. Robert B. Thompson & Hillary A. Sale, Securities Fraud as Corporate Governance: 
Reflections upon Federalism, 56 VAND. L. REV. 859, 872–78 (2003); Fox, supra note 10, at 310–13. 
 13. Urska Velikonja, The Cost of Securities Fraud, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1887, 1926–38 
(2013). 
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concerns that animate securities regulation more generally. In other words, 
the action itself is now less akin to a “private” law tort action, and more 
akin to “public” law, serving purposes associated with criminal, or at least 
regulatory, enforcement. Shareholder lawsuits do more than protect 
investors or even markets; they also act as a quasi-public mechanism for 
enforcement of societal norms.
14
 
Commentators have previously argued that vicarious liability principles 
should not be used to determine organizational liability for section 10(b) 
open-market frauds. The usual claim is that for open-market frauds—
where a corporation issues false statements about its business, but does not 
trade in its own securities—the corporation itself gains no benefit. It does 
not earn any profits from the fraud, nor is it spared any expenses. The only 
persons affected are secondary market traders who transact at the distorted 
market price, some of whom will gain by the fraud, and others of whom 
will lose. As a result, the usual instrumental justifications for vicarious 
liability do not apply.
15
  
What has been largely overlooked, however, is that courts—sensitive 
to the transformation in the nature of the section 10(b) action—have 
already limited the application of vicarious liability. Aware that the 
justifications for vicarious liability no longer fit the modern section 10(b) 
cause of action, courts have used the disaggregation of actus reus from 
mens rea commonly exhibited in fraud-on-the-market cases as a lever to 
decouple corporate liability from misconduct that originates from lower 
level employees. Instead, courts are increasingly moving toward a doctrine 
of organizational fault that resembles, both in application and policy 
justification, the organizational liability doctrine that governs suits for 
civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This form of liability, 
which the Supreme Court has deemed “direct,” rather than “vicarious,” 
only allows organizations to be held responsible for torts committed 
pursuant to official policies, actually or constructively adopted by the 
highest-level officials. This narrowed form of liability has been a feature 
of the section 10(b) case law ever since open-market frauds began to 
dominate the landscape, and has only accelerated with two recent Supreme 
Court decisions that dramatically narrowed the scope of the private 
section 10(b) action. 
 
 
 14. Cox, supra note 11, at 5–12; James D. Cox, Response, Securities Class Actions as Public 
Law, 160 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 73, 76 (2011).  
 15. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, On Leaving Corporate Executives “Naked, Homeless and 
Without Wheels”: Corporate Fraud, Equitable Remedies, and the Debate over Entity Versus 
Individual Liability, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 627, 627–29 (2007); Fox, supra note 10, at 321. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss5/7
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This interpretation of section 10(b) jurisprudence carries with it several 
important implications. First, courts should explicitly acknowledge that 
they are no longer applying vicarious liability principles to section 10(b) 
open-market frauds. This will free courts to reconcile conflicting strands in 
the case law and set clearer guidelines for organizational liability.  
Second, courts considering section 10(b) claims may be informed by 
jurisprudence developed under § 1983, which (though subject to its own 
extensive criticism) at least includes standards for determining 
organizational fault in the absence of subjective mens rea of higher level 
authorities. Courts have failed to set such standards under section 10(b), 
focusing their attention on the mental states at the top of the corporate 
hierarchy, while simultaneously failing to clarify which mental states are 
sufficient to trigger organizational liability. Unless courts identify a form 
of organizational fault that does not depend on the subjective, provable 
mens rea of a corporation’s top officers, corporate managers will be 
incentivized to tacitly encourage fraudulent behavior by their subordinates 
while maintaining plausible deniability of that behavior. And because the 
Supreme Court’s recent jurisprudence essentially immunizes those 
subordinates from personal section 10(b) liability, they will have little 
reason to resist supervisory encouragement. This would represent a “worst 
of all worlds” scenario, resulting in increased levels of fraud and corporate 
misconduct. But by taking lessons from § 1983, courts entertaining section 
10(b) claims may be able to formulate “gap-fillers” to prevent high-level 
authorities from insulating themselves from knowledge of lower level 
wrongdoing.  
Third, because courts’ changing approach to organizational liability is 
tied to the development of the fraud-on-the-market doctrine, this Article 
recommends that if that doctrine is pared back or eliminated—as scholars 
continuously advise
16—courts should restore the ordinary agency rules for 
determining organizational liability. In the absence of fraud on the market, 
the section 10(b) action would more closely resemble the common law tort 
of deceit, and the traditional justifications for vicarious liability would 
once again counsel in favor of the application of agency principles. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Congress and the Securities 
Exchange Commission (“SEC”) must make a determination as to the 
 
 
 16. See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, Confronting the Circularity Problem in Private Securities Litigation, 
2009 WIS. L. REV. 333, 348–49; Merritt B. Fox, Civil Liability and Mandatory Disclosure, 109 
COLUM. L. REV. 237, 279 (2009); Bratton & Wachter, supra note 10, at 75–76; Jennifer H. Arlen & 
William J. Carney, Vicarious Liability for Fraud on Securities Markets: Theory and Evidence, 1992 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 691, 734. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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purposes that section 10(b) is designed to serve. As this Article argues, 
part of the reason for courts’ discomfort with vicarious liability under 
section 10(b) is likely the expansion of the federal mandatory disclosure 
regime—and thus, section 10(b)’s role in the enforcement of that regime—
well past protection against traditional fraud. That problem is one that only 
Congress and the SEC can solve by making their goals clearer, so that 
courts no longer feel the need to develop ad hoc doctrines to cabin the 
shifting contours of section 10(b) liability. 
I. ORGANIZATIONAL LIABILITY UNDER FEDERAL LAW 
Under federal law, organizational liability is typically vicarious, based 
on agency principles.
17
 A principal is liable for the torts of its agents that 
are either accomplished within the scope of the agent’s authority and for 
the principal’s benefit,18 or that are within the scope of the agent’s 
apparent authority.
19
 When a tort requires a particular mental state, the 
mental state of the agent who commits the tort is imputed to the 
organization: when the agent acts negligently, recklessly, or intentionally, 
liability follows accordingly.
20
  
One of the more notable features of vicarious liability is that it does not 
matter whether the agent was a low-level employee, nor does it matter 
whether the agent was acting contrary to corporate policy or express 
instructions
21
 (although such facts may be relevant to determine whether 
the agent was acting within the scope of her authority and to benefit the 
corporation).
22
 Instead, liability is imposed “although the principal did not 
authorize, or justify, or participate in, or, indeed, know of such 
misconduct; or even if he forbade or disapproved of them.”23 For this 
reason, vicarious liability is commonly described as a form of “strict” 
liability—“[i]t neither requires the plaintiff to prove fault on the part of the 
 
 
 17. See United States v. A & P Trucking Co., 358 U.S. 121, 125–26 (1958); N.Y. Cent. & 
Hudson River R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 493–96 (1909); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 
307 F.2d 120, 127–28 (5th Cir. 1962).  
 18. N.Y. Cent., 212 U.S. at 493. 
 19. Am. Soc’y of Mech. Eng’rs v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556, 565–66 (1982).  
 20. See, e.g., A & P Trucking Co., 358 U.S. at 125; N.Y. Cent., 212 U.S. at 494–96; Standard Oil 
Co., 307 F.2d at 127–28; United States v. Nearing, 252 F. 223, 231 (S.D.N.Y. 1918). 
 21. N.Y. Cent., 212 U.S. at 493; United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000, 1007 (9th 
Cir. 1972); Standard Oil Co., 307 F.2d at 127; Egan v. United States, 137 F.2d 369, 379 (8th Cir. 
1943).  
 22. Standard Oil Co., 307 F.2d at 128–29.  
 23. McDougald v. Bellamy, 18 Ga. 411, 432 (1855). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss5/7
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employer nor allows the employer to exonerate himself by proving his 
freedom from fault.”24  
The purposes served by vicarious liability and agency principles are 
well-established. Courts have cited the master’s duty to exercise control 
over his servants so as to avoid causing harm, and the simple justice of 
requiring that one who profits by use of servants also be forced to bear the 
costs associated with them.
25
 As the Supreme Court put it,  
[t]he treasury of the business may not with impunity obtain the 
fruits of violations which are committed knowingly by agents of the 
entity in the scope of their employment. Thus pressure is brought on 
those who own the entity to see to it that their agents abide by the 
law.
26
  
Absent vicarious liability, businesses may be tempted to encourage illegal 
but profitable behavior by their judgment-proof employees, thereby 
externalizing the costs of their torts on to the public.  
Vicarious liability becomes a complicated question in the context of 
large corporations. Many organizational torts are not accomplished via a 
single actor, but instead require the cooperation or involvement of multiple 
employees, such that no single employee has personally committed all 
elements of the violation. In the case of torts that have a mens rea element, 
courts have developed the rough principle that organizational liability may 
be imposed so long as three conditions are met: (1) a harmful action 
 
 
 24. Konradi v. United States, 919 F.2d 1207, 1210 (7th Cir. 1990); see Alan O. Sykes, The 
Boundaries of Vicarious Liability: An Economic Analysis of the Scope of Employment Rule and 
Related Legal Doctrines, 101 HARV. L. REV. 563, 577 (1988).  
 25. See McDougald, 18 Ga. at 433 (“For it is well established, that where one of two innocent 
persons are to suffer from the tortious act of a third, he who gave the aggressor the means of doing the 
wrong, must alone bear the consequences of the act.”); David Jacks Achtenberg, Taking History 
Seriously: Municipal Liability Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Debate over Respondeat Superior, 73 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2183, 2197–203 (2005) (describing the typical justifications for respondeat superior 
liability offered by nineteenth century courts); Theresa A. Gabaldon, Milberg Weiss: Of Studied 
Indifference and Dying of Shame, 2 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 207, 229 (2007). 
 26. United States v. A & P Trucking Co., 358 U.S. 121, 126 (1958) (footnote omitted). As 
Prosser and Keeton describe it,  
[t]he losses caused by the torts of employees, which as a practical matter are sure to occur in 
the conduct of the employer’s enterprise, are placed upon that enterprise itself, as a required 
cost of doing business. They are placed upon the employer because, having engaged in an 
enterprise, which will on the basis of all past experience involve harm to others through the 
torts of employees, and sought to profit by it, it is just that he, rather than the innocent injured 
plaintiff, should bear them . . . .  
W. PAGE KEETON, DAN. B. DOBBS, ROBERT E. KEETON & DAVID G. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON 
THE LAW OF TORTS § 69, at 500 (5th ed. 1984). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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committed by one agent; (2) an agent who harbors the specific mens rea 
required by the offense; and (3) a causal connection between the actions of 
the agent harboring mens rea and the ultimate harmful action.  
The Ninth Circuit’s rationale in United States v. Shortt Accountancy 
Corp.
27
 provides a useful example. In that case, Shortt Accountacy, a CPA 
firm, was criminally convicted for making and subscribing false tax 
returns for a client in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1). Shortt’s chief 
operating officer (“COO”) designed an illegal tax shelter for the client. 
Pursuant to the scheme, a false return was prepared by a different Shortt 
employee based on information provided by the COO; the preparing 
employee had no knowledge of the impropriety and innocently subscribed 
to the return’s correctness.28 Under such circumstances, the Ninth Circuit 
had no trouble combining the mens rea of the COO and the actus reus of 
the innocent employee, holding that “[a] corporation will be held liable . . . 
when its agent deliberately causes it to make and subscribe to a false 
income tax return.”29 Strikingly, the court did not resort to a simple 
respondeat superior analysis to impose organizational liability based solely 
on the COO’s guilt, though it might have been able to do so.30 Instead, the 
court aggregated the actions and states of mind among the different agents 
to reach its conclusion about the liability of the organization.  
This type of liability should not be confused with an alternate scenario 
that most courts reject—namely, where no single employee harbors the 
mens rea required by the offense, but where several employees each 
separately, but innocently, have knowledge that, if aggregated, would 
suggest wrongdoing. For example, one employee might innocently make a 
false statement, while another employee—unaware of the first employee’s 
actions—has information that demonstrates the statement’s falsity.31 
Undoubtedly, if a natural person made a misstatement with knowledge of 
facts rendering it false, courts would have no trouble inferring that the 
person intentionally or recklessly misled her audience.
32
 But with a 
corporate defendant, where knowledge and action reside in different 
agents and neither individually harbors mens rea—where, in short, the 
right hand does not know what the left hand is doing—courts generally 
 
 
 27. 785 F.2d 1448 (9th Cir. 1986). 
 28. Id. at 1450–51. 
 29. Id. at 1454. 
 30. The COO may have personally committed violations of the relevant statutes; he was charged 
alongside the corporation, though he did not appeal. Id. at 1451–52. 
 31. See, e.g., Woodmont, Inc. v. Daniels, 274 F.2d 132, 137 (10th Cir. 1959); United States v. 
United Techs., Corp., 51 F. Supp. 2d 167, 196–99 (D. Conn. 1999). 
 32. See, e.g., Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 311–12 (2d Cir. 2000).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss5/7
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agree that there is no organizational mens rea,
33
 at least not unless 
communication failures between the right hand and left hand were so 
egregious, and evidenced such disregard for legal requirements, that they 
amount to organizational “willful blindness.”34  
But when there is at least one agent who personally harbors mens rea 
and causes the corporation to commit a harmful act, it is widely accepted 
in many areas of law that the corporation may be held responsible.
35
 In the 
employment discrimination context, the concept is called “cat’s paw” 
liability, a reference to a fable in which a monkey persuades a cat to grab 
chestnuts out of a fire, and then makes off with the chestnuts while the cat 
suffers burned paws.
36
  
 
 
 33. See U.S. ex rel. Harrison v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 352 F.3d 908, 918 n.9 (4th 
Cir. 2003); Saba v. Compagnie Nationale Air Fr., 78 F.3d 664, 670 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (“[C]orporate 
knowledge of certain facts [can be] accumulated from the knowledge of various individuals, but the 
proscribed intent (willfulness) depend[s] on the wrongful intent of specific employees.”); Browning v. 
Fidelity Trust Co., 250 F. 321, 326–27 (3d Cir. 1918);United States v. LBS Bank-N.Y., Inc., 757 F. 
Supp. 496, 501 n.7 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (citations omitted) (“Although knowledge possessed by employees 
is aggregated so that a corporate defendant is considered to have acquired the collective knowledge of 
its employees, specific intent cannot be aggregated similarly.”); First Equity Corp. v. Standard & 
Poor’s Corp., 690 F. Supp. 256, 260 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (“While . . . a corporation may be charged with 
the collective knowledge of its employees, it does not follow that the corporation may be deemed to 
have a culpable state of mind when that state of mind is possessed by no single employee.”). 
 34. See, e.g., United States v. Bank of New England, N.A., 821 F.2d 844, 855 (1st Cir. 1987) (A 
bank “willfully” violates certain Treasury regulations if the bank as a whole is “flagrantly indifferent 
to its obligations”); id. at 855–56 (Willful blindness exists where “the bank as an organization 
consciously avoided learning about and observing [regulatory] requirements.”); United States v. Sci. 
Applications Int’l Corp., 626 F.3d 1257, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Corporation’s recklessness or 
deliberate ignorance may be established where “a plaintiff can prove that [the company’s] structure 
prevented it from learning [the relevant] facts”); id. at 1276 (A jury may consider company’s “systems 
and structure” and the adequacy of the company’s compliance system to determine if the company 
acted with scienter); see also Thomas A. Hagemann and Joseph Grinstein, The Mythology of 
Aggregate Corporate Knowledge: A Deconstruction, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 210, 237–38 (1997). The 
Restatement (Third) of Agency § 5.03 (Tentative Draft No. 3, 2002), provided that the principal’s 
intent may be “based on inferences to be drawn from the fact that agents could act with ignorance of 
the acts and omissions of other agents with adverse consequences for third parties,” but this section 
was dropped from the final version of the Third Restatement, without commentary.  
 35. See, e.g., Am. Soc’y of Mech. Eng’rs v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556 (1982) (holding an 
industry standard-setting organization liable under the Sherman Act when two members of the 
organization used their positions to manipulate a committee secretary into distributing a letter in 
ASME’s name disparaging a competitor’s product); ING Bank v. PNC Fin. Servs. Group, 629 F. Supp. 
2d 351, 354–56 (D. Del. 2009) (corporation properly charged with fraud on the patent office when 
certain unnamed employees had knowingly caused the corporate secretary to submit a false 
declaration); Sci. Applications Int’l Corp., 626 F.3d at 1276 (False Claims Act); Grand Union Co. v. 
United States, 696 F.2d 888, 890–91 (11th Cir. 1983) (same); U.S. ex rel. Harrison v. Westinghouse 
Savannah River Co., 352 F.3d 908, 919 (4th Cir. 2003) (same). 
 36. Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 131 S. Ct. 1186, 1190 n.1 (2011). To spin out the analogy, the 
monkey is aware of the danger of grabbing the chestnuts, and the cat is not; the monkey therefore uses 
the innocent cat to obtain his goal without personally taking the dangerous action.  
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That said, the Supreme Court recently addressed the issue of cat’s paw 
liability in Staub v. Proctor Hospital
37
 and put its own spin on the case 
law. The plaintiff, army reservist Vincent Staub, claimed that his 
immediate supervisors at his employer, Proctor Hospital, resented his 
military obligations. The supervisors filed unjustified disciplinary actions 
against him, which ultimately caused the vice president of human 
resources to fire him. Staub sued Proctor under the Uniformed Services 
Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA), which prohibits 
employers from denying “retention in employment”38 to a servicemember, 
where service membership is “a motivating factor in the employer’s 
action.”39 The Supreme Court was thus forced to determine whether the 
mens rea of the supervisors could be combined with the actus reus of the 
vice president for the purposes of determining the hospital’s USERRA 
liability.  
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, first held that the statutory 
language did not support such an aggregation:  
When a decision to fire is made with no unlawful animus on the part 
of the firing agent, but partly on the basis of a report prompted 
(unbeknownst to that agent) by discrimination, discrimination might 
perhaps be called a “factor” or a “causal factor” in the decision; but 
it seems to us a considerable stretch to call it “a motivating 
factor.”40 
The Court supported this reasoning by citing to the Restatement (Second) 
of Agency, which, it held, advised that the “malicious mental state of one 
agent cannot generally be combined with the harmful action of another 
agent to hold the principal liable for a tort that requires both.”41 The Court 
concluded, however, this problem could be solved with a close reading of 
the statutory text. As the Court put it: 
Animus and responsibility for the adverse action can both be 
attributed to the earlier agent (here, Staub’s supervisors) if the 
adverse action is the intended consequence of that agent’s 
discriminatory conduct. So long as the agent intends, for 
discriminatory reasons, that the adverse action occur, he has the 
scienter required to be liable under USERRA. And it is axiomatic 
 
 
 37. Id. at 1186. 
 38. 38 U.S.C. § 4311(a) (2012). 
 39. Id. § 4311(c)(1). 
 40. Staub, 131 S. Ct. at 1192. 
 41. Id. at 1191. 
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under tort law that the exercise of judgment by the decisionmaker 
[in this case, the vice president] does not prevent the earlier agent’s 
action (and hence the earlier agent’s discriminatory animus) from 
being the proximate cause of the harm.
42
 
Thus, the Court elided the question whether the harmful conduct of one 
agent can be combined with the harmful intent of another by redefining the 
concept of harmful conduct in the first place, interpreting the statute itself 
to mean both that decisionmakers may not discharge persons with a 
discriminatory motive, and that intermediate actors may not intentionally 
take steps that cause a discharge. As the Court put it, its new interpretation 
of the scope of the statute’s prohibitions permitted it to “avoid[] the 
aggregation of animus and adverse action”43 that it believed to be of 
questionable legitimacy.  
Concurring in the judgment, Justice Alito, joined by Justice Thomas, 
rejected the Court’s reliance on principles of agency and tort common law. 
Instead, they interpreted the statute to require that the same decisionmaker 
who took the adverse action must also harbor the discriminatory animus.
44
 
They believed that on this record, however, there was evidence that 
responsibility for the final decision to fire Staub had been partly delegated 
from the person with “formal decisionmaking authority” to one of Staub’s 
supervisors.
45
 Since that supervisor was motivated by animus, the 
requirements of the statute were met.
46
 
One intriguing aspect of the majority opinion was its invocation of the 
Restatement (Second) of Agency. Contrary to the majority’s view, the 
Second Restatement does not prohibit the combination of malicious mental 
state and action; instead, it draws the same distinction that the earlier case 
law does between a court cobbling together “innocent” pieces of 
knowledge, and an agent who intentionally manipulates the principal, 
allowing liability to be imposed in the latter circumstance. The 
Restatement accomplishes this by distinguishing between imputation of 
“notice” of a fact to a principal and imputation of “actual knowledge,” 
 
 
 42. Id. at 1192. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 1195 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 45. Id.  
 46. Id. at 1195–96. 
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which is akin to a subjective state of mind. Notice of a fact is not sufficient 
to impose liability for torts that require scienter,
47
 but  
[i]f the agent consciously and purposely fails to reveal the 
information [in connection with a given transaction], the principal 
may be liable because, under the circumstances, the conduct of the 
agent has the same effect as if the agent had personally acted and 
were himself guilty of the fraudulent or other tortious conduct.
48
 
Similarly, the Restatement provides that ordinarily, if an agent discovers 
information that he fails to communicate to the principal, and the principal 
makes a misrepresentation as a result, the principal is not liable for 
fraud—unless the agent “had intended [the principal] to make the 
misrepresentation.”49 Thus, the Restatement fully permits liability to be 
imposed on principals based on the manipulative behind-the-scenes 
actions of their agents, despite the Supreme Court’s suggestion to the 
contrary.
50
 
In any event, the implications of this line of case law is clear: In the 
ordinary course, an organization has the scienter of employees who either 
personally commit a prohibited act or who, acting with the relevant 
scienter, proximately cause the organization to commit the act. 
 
 
 47. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 275 (1958) (“Except . . . where knowledge 
as distinguished from reason to know is important, the principal is affected by the knowledge which an 
agent has a duty to disclose to the principal or to another agent of the principal to the same extent as if 
the principal had the information.” (emphasis added)); id. § 275 cmt. b; id. § 268 cmt. d (“If the agent 
fails to transmit the information [to the principal] . . . the principal is not responsible in an action in 
which a consciousness of the fact not revealed is a necessary element.” (emphasis added)). 
 48. Id. § 268 cmt. d. 
 49. Id. § 275 cmt. b, illus. 4. These sections do not address the many variations on the scenarios 
described—such as where an agent affirmatively misleads the principal by communicating false 
information (which presumably is subsumed under the general rubric of withholding information), or 
withholds information from a fellow agent rather than the principal himself (particularly relevant 
where the principal is an organization and thus only acts through other agents), or withholds 
information recklessly rather than intentionally. Nonetheless, the theme appears to be similar to that in 
the case law—i.e., a principal’s mens rea cannot be constructed out of “innocent” knowledge held by 
its agents, but guilty knowledge and intentions may be imputed to the principal, even if the relevant 
actus reus was committed by a different agent. 
 50. Staub, 131 S. Ct. at 1191. The situation becomes murkier when one considers the 
Restatement (Third) of Agency, which was adopted in 2005 but was not cited in Staub. That 
Restatement eliminates the references to agents who intentionally manipulate their principals into 
acting tortiously, and instead, merely repeats the basic rule that an agent’s knowledge is imputed to the 
principal, but that knowledge alone will not result in liability for torts that require intentional conduct 
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 5.03 (2006); id. § 5.03 illus. 15 (“[A] principal may 
not be subject to liability for fraud if one agent makes a statement, believing it to be true, while another 
agent knows facts that falsify the other agent’s statement. Although notice is imputed to the principal 
of the facts known by the knowledgeable agent, the agent who made the false statement did not do so 
intending to defraud the person to whom the statement was made.”). 
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II. THE DIFFERENT RULES APPLICABLE TO § 10(B) 
Vicarious liability has long been viewed with suspicion in the context 
of section 10(b). Historically, the objection has been textual
51
: because 
vicarious liability is a form of “strict” liability, many have argued that it 
conflicts with section 20(a) of the Exchange Act, which imposes liability 
on those who “control” others who violate section 10(b).52 “Controlling 
persons” are permitted a good faith defense; thus, it has often been argued, 
vicarious liability principles, which do not permit a good faith defense, 
undermine the “controlling person” provisions. 
After an initial flurry of court activity that roughly settled in favor of 
the application of ordinary agency principles to section 10(b),
53
 the debate 
was rekindled in 1994, when the Supreme Court decided Central Bank of 
Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A.
54
 The Supreme Court 
held that under a strict textual analysis, section 10(b) “prohibits only the 
making of a material misstatement (or omission) or the commission of a 
manipulative act,” and does not extend to “aiding and abetting” another’s 
fraud.
55
 This decision sparked new arguments that vicarious liability 
represented a form of “extratextual” liability, akin to aiding and abetting, 
and equally void.
56
 Tellingly, the Central Bank majority repeatedly cited 
to Professor Daniel Fischel’s 1981 article, Secondary Liability Under 
Section 10(b) of the Securities Act of 1934, which argued that aiding and 
abetting, conspiracy, and respondeat superior all represented forms of 
 
 
 51. See, e.g., Christoffel v. E. F. Hutton & Co., 588 F.2d 665, 667 (9th Cir. 1978), overruled by 
Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 1564, 1577 (9th Cir. 1990) (en banc); Jackson v. Bache & 
Co., 381 F. Supp. 71, 95 (N.D. Cal. 1974); Daniel R. Fischel, Secondary Liability Under Section 10(b) 
of the Securities Act of 1934, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 80, 87 (1981); William J. Fitzpatrick & Ronald T. 
Carman, Respondeat Superior and the Federal Securities Laws: A Round Peg in a Square Hole, 12 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 17–19 (1983); Ediberto Román, Statutory Interpretation in Securities 
Jurisprudence: A Failure of Textualism, 75 NEB. L. REV. 377, 395 (1996). 
 52. See 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (2012) (“Every person who, directly or indirectly, controls any person 
liable under any provision of this chapter or of any rule or regulation thereunder shall also be liable 
jointly and severally with and to the same extent as such controlled person to any person to whom such 
controlled person is liable . . . unless the controlling person acted in good faith and did not directly or 
indirectly induce the act or acts constituting the violation or cause of action.”). 
 53. See In re Villa, 261 F.3d 1148, 1152 n.5 (11th Cir. 2001) (citing cases). 
 54. 511 U.S. 164 (1994). 
 55. Id. at 177. 
 56. See, e.g., In re Fidelity/Micron Sec. Litig., 964 F. Supp. 539, 544 (D. Mass. 1997); Converse, 
Inc. v. Norwood Venture Corp., No. 96 CIV . 3745 (HB), 1997 WL 742534, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 
1997); In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practices Litig., 975 F. Supp. 584, 612–13 (D.N.J. 1996); 
see also Robert A. Prentice, Conceiving the Inconceivable and Judicially Implementing the 
Preposterous: The Premature Demise of Respondeat Superior Liability Under Section 10(b), 58 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 1325, 1330–31 (1997). 
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liability that were not supported by section 10(b)’s text,57 suggesting that 
vicarious liability would be the next to fall. Even Justice Stevens’s Central 
Bank dissent argued that the majority’s decision cast doubt on the 
continuing vitality of respondeat superior and related agency doctrines.
58
  
Most courts, however, eventually concluded that vicarious liability 
survived Central Bank. For one thing, the Exchange Act explicitly makes 
corporations liable for section 10(b) violations, which most courts 
interpreted as being impossible without resort to agency principles.
59
 
Additionally, as the Third Circuit observed, unlike aiding and abetting, 
“courts imposing liability on agency theories are not expanding the 
category of affirmative conduct proscribed by the relevant statute; rather, 
they are deciding on whose shoulders to place responsibility for conduct 
indisputably proscribed by the relevant statute.”60  
A. Courts Resist Application of Agency Principles in Open-Market 
Section 10(b) Cases 
Despite courts’ ostensible acceptance of vicarious liability principles in 
the section 10(b) context, the reality is more complex, at least when it 
comes to open-market frauds committed by publicly traded corporations. 
This is because when it comes to open-market frauds, disaggregation is 
particularly salient. These frauds are, by definition, based on public 
announcements in the form of officially-sanctioned statements issued 
under the corporate imprimatur, such as SEC filings, press releases, or 
publicly broadcast conference calls between CEOs and market analysts. 
Official corporate statements may be attributed to top corporate officers, 
but they frequently depend on information provided by a myriad of 
anonymous agents operating at all levels of the company who may 
intentionally or recklessly pass along inaccurate or misleading 
information. In such circumstances, the actus reus that forms the basis of 
the alleged section 10(b) violation—the false public statement—has been 
disaggregated from the actor who harbors the relevant mental state. This 
disaggregation has become a pressure point that courts have used to 
narrow and eschew the agency principles applied in other areas of law. 
 
 
 57. Fischel, supra note 51, at 106–07. 
 58. 511 U.S. at 200 n.12 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 59. See, e.g., Suez Equity Investors, L.P. v. Toronto-Dominion Bank, 250 F.3d 87, 101 (2d Cir. 
2001); Paul F. Newton & Co. v. Tex. Commerce Bank, 630 F.2d 1111, 1118 (5th Cir. 1980) (citing 
SEC v. Mgmt. Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d 801, 812 (2d Cir. 1975)); In re Centennial Techs. Litig., 52 F. 
Supp. 2d 178, 185 (D. Mass. 1999). 
 60. AT&T Co. v. Winback & Conserve Program, Inc., 42 F.3d 1421, 1430–31 (3d Cir. 1994).  
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With few exceptions, courts have been willing to aggregate mens rea and 
actus reus only where mens rea is harbored by another high level actor, 
who may be presumed to have caused, if only from behind the scenes, the 
false statement by approving or drafting it. Forms of causation most likely 
to emanate from lower level employees are disregarded, frequently 
without explanation. 
For example, in Southland Securities Corp. v. INSpire Insurance 
Solutions, Inc.,
61
 the Fifth Circuit formally endorsed an approach similar 
to that used by courts outside the 10(b) context, namely, that the scienter 
of the “individual corporate official or officials who make or issue the 
statement (or order or approve it or its making or issuance, or who furnish 
information or language for inclusion therein, or the like)” is imputed to 
the corporation.
62
 Just as courts had done previously, the Fifth Circuit 
refused to aggregate the innocently held knowledge of multiple agents to 
create a guilty state of mind, but it was willing to allow for a “cat’s paw” 
style of liability, whereby corporate liability would exist if a behind-the-
scenes agent intentionally funneled false information to the public via 
internal corporate reporting channels.
63
 In making this decision, the Fifth 
Circuit cited the Second Restatement for the proposition that a principal is 
liable when an agent consciously and purposefully withholds 
information.
64
 
Other appellate courts, however, have expressed varying degrees of 
discomfort with the Fifth Circuit’s rule. The Seventh Circuit, while 
acknowledging that Southland stated the common law rule, refused to 
endorse it to the extent it would impute to the corporation the scienter of 
mid-level agents, apparently concerned that ordinary agency principles 
might stretch too far.
65
 Three circuits have formally endorsed either 
 
 
 61. 365 F.3d 353 (5th Cir. 2004). 
 62. Id. at 366. Though the court began by discussing corporate “officers,” subsequent references 
to “agents” and “employees” suggest that the court was unconcerned with the rank of the relevant 
agent. See id. at 367.  
 63. See id. at 366–67. Additionally, in the earlier case of Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 649 F.2d 
175 (3d Cir. 1981), the Third Circuit imposed section 10(b) liability on an accounting firm when one 
of its associates, acting with scienter, contributed to a false opinion letter that was distributed on the 
firm’s behalf. In that case, the Third Circuit refused to declare a general rule for aggregating the 
conduct of multiple agents, or even to endorse agency liability in section 10(b) cases across the board. 
Instead, it decided it is the firm’s obligation, under these circumstances, to “exercise a high degree of 
care in preparation of the letter, and this care included close supervision of its employee.” Id. at 183. 
But see Prentice, supra note 56, at 1327 n.8 (arguing that Sharp’s rule would functionally permit 
agency liability in all cases). 
 64. Southland Sec. Corp., 365 F.3d at 366 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 275 
cmt. b, § 268 cmt. d (1958)). 
 65. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs Inc., 513 F.3d 702, 708 (7th Cir. 2008).  
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Southland or a similar formulation, but have then gone on to apply the rule 
in a more truncated fashion, considering only the scienter of high-level 
employees when determining organizational liability—even in the face of 
explicit allegations that the misstatements were the result of lower level 
employees intentionally filtering false information up through corporate 
reporting channels.
66
 At least three other circuits, without declaring a 
general rule on the subject, have ignored company admissions that 
fraudulent information supplied by low-level officers and employees had 
been incorporated into public financial statements. In those cases, again, 
the courts focused their attention solely on whether the plaintiffs had 
demonstrated that the highest officers had intentionally or recklessly 
issued false public statements, and concluded they had not.
67
 In all of these 
cases, the actions of the lower level employees were only relevant to the 
extent they created an evidentiary inference that the misinformation was 
known at the top of the corporate hierarchy; because the courts concluded 
the inference was not strong enough, the complaints were dismissed.
68
 
Even the Fifth Circuit later seemed to dodge its own rule. In an 
unpublished opinion in Pipefitters Local No. 636 Defined Benefit Plan v. 
 
 
 66. See Mizzaro v. Home Depot, Inc., 544 F.3d 1230, 1241, 1254–55 (11th Cir. 2008); 
Teamsters Local 445 Freight Div. Pension Fund v. Dynex Capital Inc., 531 F.3d 190, 193, 195 (2d Cir. 
2008); In re Dynex Capital, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 05 Civ. 1897(HB), 2006 WL 314524, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. 
Feb. 10, 2006); see also In re Omnicare, Inc. Sec. Litig., 769 F.3d 455, 476 (6th Cir. 2014). In 
Omnicare, the Sixth Circuit took a particularly bizarre approach: it formally adopted the Southland 
standard, which depends on finding mens rea within a single actor, but then abandoned the standard in 
the very same case, seeking to identify corporate scienter by conducting a holistic analysis of the 
corporation’s intentions, apparently divorced from the intention of any single employee (including one 
who, the court admitted, had been aware of the misconduct the corporation had concealed). See 
Omnicare, 769 F.3d at 476, 483–84. 
 67. See Kushner v. Beverly Enters., Inc., 317 F.3d 820, 828 (8th Cir. 2003); Matrix Capital 
Mgmt. Fund, L.P. v. BearingPoint, Inc., 576 F.3d 172, 177, 188–90 (4th Cir. 2009); In re Alpharma 
Inc. Sec. Litig., 372 F.3d 137, 150 (3d Cir. 2004). 
 68. In Nordstrom, Inc. v. Chubb & Son, Inc., 54 F.3d 1424 (9th Cir. 1995), the Ninth Circuit 
suggested that if non-officer-level employees—in that case, the personnel director and public relations 
director—intentionally or recklessly contributed to false corporate statements, they would have 
committed a section 10(b) violation, and the corporation would be vicariously liable. Id. at 1433–34. 
Though the Nordstrom court expressly distinguished this possibility from the distinct concept cobbling 
together innocently held knowledge, which it called “collective scienter,” id. at 1435 (internal 
quotation marks omitted), for many years, the case was interpreted to mean that a corporation’s 
scienter may only be derived from corporate officers who personally “make” false statements. See, 
e.g., In re Apple Computer, Inc., Sec. Litig., 243 F. Supp. 2d 1012 (N.D. Cal. 2002), aff’d sub nom. In 
re Apple Computer, Inc., 127 Fed. App’x 296 (9th Cir. 2005). Yet the scope of this rule was never 
clear because at the time, the Ninth Circuit also had an unusually lenient standard for determining 
whether an official has “made” a statement. See In re Software Toolworks Inc. Sec. Litig., 50 F.3d 
615, 628 n.3 (9th Cir. 1994). More recently, in Glazer Capital Mgmt., LP v. Magistri, 549 F.3d 736 
(9th Cir. 2008), the Ninth Circuit held that corporate scienter would be determined only by looking to 
the state of mind of the persons to whom the statements were expressly attributed, while leaving open 
the possibility that it would use a different approach in other cases. Id. at 744–45.  
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Zale Corp.,
69
 the Fifth Circuit dismissed a complaint where the company 
conceded that a mid-level vice president had falsified accounting entries in 
her department, causing the company to issue false public statements.
70
 
Rather than explicitly reject Southland and hold that the vice president’s 
scienter would not be imputed to the organization, the Fifth Circuit instead 
held that she had “acted with the intent to maintain the good appearance of 
her department rather than to defraud investors,” 71 and thus did not harbor 
the relevant mens rea. In reaching this conclusion, the Fifth Circuit 
actually quoted Southland but omitted Southland’s reference to employees 
who furnish false information.
72
  
To be sure, in many—though not all—of these cases, the wrongdoing 
occurred at a subsidiary, potentially raising issues of corporate 
separateness, and the propriety of attributing the mens rea of the 
subsidiary’s agents to the parent. But it seems unlikely that respect for the 
corporate form was what motivated these decisions. Not only is it 
exceedingly rare for courts to voice such concerns,
73
 but also many cases 
 
 
 69. 499 Fed. App’x 345 (5th Cir. 2012) (unpublished). 
 70. See id. at 347–48. 
 71. Id. at 351.  
 72. See id. at 349. Many district courts have explicitly stated what appellate courts seem to be 
unwilling to admit—that the mens rea of lower level employees may not be attributed to the 
corporation. See, e.g., In re Moody’s Corp. Sec. Litig., 599 F. Supp. 2d 493, 515–16 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) 
(courts should look only to the “scienter [of] management-level employees” when determining 
corporate mens rea); In re Faro Techs. Sec. Litig., 534 F. Supp. 2d 1248, 1262 (M.D. Fla. 2007) (“[I]n 
order to state an actionable claim of institutional fraud, this Court holds that scienter must be found as 
to either the employee making the alleged false statement to the market or as to any other high level 
employee. . . .”); Hill v. Tribune Co., Nos. 05 C 2602, 05 C 2927 & 06 C 0741, 2006 WL 2861016, at 
*12 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 29, 2006), aff’d sub nom. Pugh v. Tribune Co., 521 F.3d 686 (7th Cir. 2008) 
(“[T]he corporation’s scienter is generally limited to being based on knowledge or scienter of a senior 
officer or director of the corporation, or an employee involved in issuing the alleged 
misrepresentation.”); In re VeriFone Holdings, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. C 07-6140 MHP, 2011 WL 
1045120, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 22, 2011), rev’d on other grounds, 704 F.3d 694 (9th Cir. 2012) (“It is 
undisputed that Periolat [the supply chain controller] was not a VeriFone officer, and he made none of 
the challenged statements. Periolat’s misconduct is therefore not attributable to VeriFone.”). 
 73. For example, In re Alpharma Inc. Securities Litigation, 372 F.3d 137 (3d Cir. 2004); City of 
Roseville Employees’ Retirement System v. Horizon Lines, Inc., 442 Fed. App’x 672 (3d Cir. 2011); 
Matrix Capital Management Fund, L.P. v. BearingPoint, Inc., 576 F.3d 172 (4th Cir. 2009); Teamsters 
Local 445 Freight Division Pension Fund v. Dynex Capital Inc., 531 F.3d 190 (2d Cir. 2008); and In 
re Sunpower Securities Litigation, No. C 09-5473 RS, 2011 WL 7404238 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 2011) 
all involved parent companies that issued false statements concerning misconduct that filtered up from 
their wholly-owned subsidiaries, but the issue of separate incorporation is not mentioned in any of the 
opinions. A prominent exception is Pugh v. Tribune Co., 521 F.3d 686 (7th Cir. 2008). In Pugh, the 
parent corporation issued false statements based on information supplied by a wholly-owned 
subsidiary. Invoking agency principles and corporate separateness, the Seventh Circuit refused to 
impute the mens rea of one of the subsidiary’s officers to the parent. See id. at 698. But this is an 
outlier, rather than the norm. Even in that case, the subsidiary was publicly presented as a standalone 
business, with its own trade name, rather than being merely an arm of the parent’s operations. 
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involve fact patterns that, at least at the pleading stage, seem appropriate 
for veil-piercing.
74 
 
The cases are very different, however, when the behind-the-scenes 
actor is of a high level, such as a top officer or a member of the board of 
directors. In these circumstances, the high-level actor’s approval of the 
false statement—even if only presumed at the pleading stage—triggers 
liability not only against the actor personally, but also against the 
organization.
75
  
Notably, courts rarely, if ever, are forced to confront these issues in the 
context of SEC enforcement actions rather than individual, fraud-on-the-
market claims, likely because the SEC, apparently as a matter of policy, 
does not typically bring actions against organizations for open-market 
disclosure violations originating at lower levels of the company. As a 
result, the question of organizational liability under these circumstances 
almost always arises in private actions, brought using the fraud-on-the-
market theory.  
 
 
 74. For example, In re Dynex involved a parent and wholly-owned subsidiary that not only 
shared officers, but also a single business address and telephone number. See Amended Class Action 
Complaint at ¶¶ 26–27, In re Dynex Capital, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 05 Civ. 1897(HB), 2006 WL 314524, 
at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 10, 2006). Moreover, it is not clear that corporate separateness should be a 
relevant consideration in the context of financial reporting. Professor Langevoort points out that SEC 
reporting requirements cross corporate lines and require that the organization be treated as one unit. 
See Langevoort, supra note 2, at 961.  
 75. This is the foundation of what is known as the “group pleading” doctrine. While there have 
been conflicting definitions of “group pleading,” the most common one is that it is a pleading 
presumption that statements in “group published” documents, such as corporate press releases and 
SEC filings, “are the collective work of those individuals with direct involvement in the everyday 
business of the company.” In re Pfizer Inc. Sec. Litig., 584 F. Supp. 2d 621, 637 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). The 
doctrine is used to help plaintiffs satisfy the pleading requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
9(b) and the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (“PSLRA”) by establishing, for pleading 
purposes, that a company’s top officers are responsible for drafting or approving the contents of 
allegedly false official corporate statements, even if their names are not explicitly attached. If the 
plaintiff is then able to plead facts demonstrating that any of those officers acted with scienter, the 
court will conclude that the plaintiff’s complaint sufficiently establishes that those officers (and, via 
vicarious principles, their corporate employer) violated section 10(b). Thus, although the doctrine is 
technically a pleading tool to help plaintiffs connect specific company officers to unattributed false 
statements, the legal premise that underlies the doctrine is that if an officer does, in fact, anonymously 
draft, disseminate, review, or approve false public statements, that officer has “made” a statement for 
Rule 10b-5 purposes. Though some courts have rejected, as a pleading matter, the presumption that 
high-level corporate officers are involved in approving corporate statements—these courts require 
plaintiffs to allege specific facts demonstrating such involvement, see Southland Sec. Corp. v. INSpire 
Ins. Solutions Inc., 365 F.3d 353, 365 (5th Cir. 2004)—there has been wide agreement that anonymous 
drafting, review, or approval of false public statements by a high-level officer is enough to impose 
liability both on the officer and the corporate entity. That agreement largely persists even after the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Janus, which is discussed further below. 
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B. The Supreme Court Affirms that Section 10(b) Is Different  
Two recent Supreme Court decisions have only lent further support to 
lower courts’ refusal to impute the scienter of lower level actors to the 
corporation.  
First, in Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, 
Inc.,
76
 the Supreme Court narrowed the test for “causation” in private 
section 10(b) cases. Shareholders of Charter Communications alleged that 
two of Charter’s vendors helped Charter report phantom revenue by 
jointly engaging in “wash” transactions.77 The Supreme Court held that the 
vendors’ conduct only constituted aiding and abetting, and thus could not 
trigger private liability under section 10(b) under Central Bank, because 
the chain of causation between the vendors’ actions and Charter’s false 
statements was “too remote.”78 In the Court’s view, Charter chose to 
fraudulently account for the transactions; nothing the vendors did “made it 
necessary or inevitable for Charter to record the transactions as it did.”79 
The Court acknowledged that its new “necessity” test was stricter than the 
common law, but justified its holding on the ground that Congress had not 
intended to provide broad liability against “the entire marketplace in which 
the issuing company operates.”80  
Stoneridge did not involve a cat’s paw scenario: two different 
companies were involved, and Charter itself was not an innocent dupe. 
Nonetheless, courts have interpreted Stoneridge to apply even within a 
single corporation (or corporate group); thus, where “behind-the-scenes” 
agents were alleged to have funneled false information to the public, 
courts refused to impose liability on the agent, deeming the connection 
between the agent’s act and the final misstatement too attenuated.81 Where 
no higher level agents were alleged to have known of the fraud, claims 
against the organization were dismissed.
82
  
 
 
 76. 552 U.S. 148 (2008). 
 77. Id. at 153–55. 
 78. Id. at 159. 
 79. Id. at 161. 
 80. Id. at 162.  
 81. See, e.g., Katz v. Image Innovations Holdings, Inc., 542 F. Supp. 2d 269 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) 
(internal bookkeepers alleged to have participated in accounting fraud); In re Brocade Commc’ns Sys., 
Inc. Derivative Litig., 615 F. Supp. 2d 1018 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (CFO who allegedly participated in 
options backdating scheme); In re Dura Pharms., Inc. Sec. Litig., 548 F. Supp. 2d 1126 (S.D. Cal. 
2008) (senior vice president alleged to have participated in channel-stuffing); SEC v. Lucent Techs., 
Inc., 610 F. Supp. 2d 342 (D.N.J. 2009) (sales executives who intentionally withheld information from 
corporate accounting department). 
 82. See In re Int’l Rectifier Corp. Sec. Litig., No. CV 07-02544-JFW, 2008 WL 4555794, at *10-
12, *21 (C.D. Cal. May 23, 2008) (vice president alleged to have orchestrated accounting fraud); Pugh 
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Three years later, in Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative 
Traders,
83
 the Supreme Court was faced with another case involving a 
behind-the-scenes actor. This time, however, unlike in Stoneridge, the 
entity that issued the statement publicly had no knowledge of the 
misinformation. Nonetheless, the Court refused to hold the behind-the-
scenes actor liable. 
In Janus, a mutual fund, issued a prospectus that falsely claimed that 
the fund placed limits on trading that would protect the fund from damage 
caused by sophisticated arbitrage techniques. Though the prospectus was 
issued in the fund’s name, the fund itself was a shell entity, owned by its 
investors, but entirely controlled by its investment adviser. All of the 
fund’s officers were also officers of the investment adviser, and the 
adviser both drafted the false prospectus and set the policies that had been 
misdescribed.
84
 The plaintiffs sued the adviser, alleging that as the drafter 
of the prospectuses, it was liable for the false statements contained 
therein.
85
 
The Supreme Court, per Justice Thomas, rejected the argument that the 
adviser was responsible for the false statements in the prospectus it had 
drafted. The Court reasoned that under Central Bank and Stoneridge, the 
only person who “makes” a statement is “the person or entity with 
ultimate authority over the statement, including its content and whether 
and how to communicate it.”86 Under this rule, one who merely provides 
false information for inclusion in a statement is not its maker and thus has 
not committed a primary violation under Central Bank.
87
 The Court 
counseled that, though not dispositive of the question, “attribution within a 
statement or implicit from surrounding circumstances is strong evidence 
that a statement was made by—and only by—the party to whom it is 
attributed.”88 In one particularly telling sentence, the Court held that to 
impose liability on the adviser for the prospectus’s contents would be to 
 
 
v. Tribune Co., 521 F.3d 686, 698 (7th Cir. 2008) (officer of wholly-owned subsidiary of defendant 
corporation). 
 83. 131 S. Ct. 2296 (2011). 
 84. Id. at 2299–300. The prospectus represented that the fund did not permit “market timing,” 
when in fact it was permitted. Market timing is a trading strategy that allows some investors to rapidly 
buy and sell mutual fund shares so as to take advantage of brief delays before the mutual fund updates 
its asset valuations. It is legal but it can harm the other investors in the mutual fund. See id. at 2300 
n.1. 
 85. The plaintiffs were not investors in the fund, but instead were shareholders in the parent 
company of the adviser. They claimed that the false statements in the fund prospectus inflated the 
parent company’s stock price. Id. at 2300. 
 86. Id. at 2302.  
 87. See id. at 2303. 
 88. Id. at 2302. 
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create a form of liability that is “similar to—but broader in application 
than—what Congress has already created expressly elsewhere” in section 
20(a), i.e., the controlling person provision that sparked the original 
debates over the application of vicarious liability principles to section 
10(b) claims.
89
 The Court reconciled its holding with Stoneridge by 
reasoning that absent “ultimate authority,” the Stoneridge causation test—
requiring that the actor’s conduct make the false statement “necessary or 
inevitable”—could not be met.90 
Writing in dissent, Justice Breyer expressed concern that the majority’s 
rule would leave plaintiffs without remedies, even for intentional frauds:  
The possibility of guilty management and innocent board is the 13th 
stroke of the new rule’s clock. What is to happen when guilty 
management writes a prospectus (for the board) containing 
materially false statements and fools both board and public into 
believing they are true? Apparently under the majority’s rule, in 
such circumstances no one could be found to have “ma[d]e” a 
materially false statement . . . .
91
  
As it turns out, despite Justice Breyer’s fears, most district courts have 
rejected the suggestion that an organization’s board of directors—and not 
the corporate officers—are the ultimate authority for corporate actions. 
Instead, it is generally agreed that officers who approve statements for 
public distribution, or who personally speak to the public, are the “ultimate 
authority” and thus “maker” of corporate statements. When these officers 
act with scienter, they may be held liable, and so may the corporate 
entity.
92
 Nonetheless, Justice Breyer’s concern is well-taken: when Janus, 
Stoneridge, and the employment case of Staub are considered together, it 
becomes clear that the traditional rules courts have used to aggregate actus 
reus and mens rea no longer hold. 
As discussed above, in Staub, the Court addressed a situation in which 
one agent fired the plaintiff, while another harbored a discriminatory 
animus. The defendant advocated, essentially, an “ultimate authority” 
 
 
 89. Id. at 2304. 
 90. Id. at 2302–03. 
 91. Id. at 2310 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (alteration in original). 
 92. See, e.g., City of Roseville Emps. Ret. Sys. v. EnergySolutions, Inc., 814 F. Supp. 2d 395, 
417 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); In re Merck & Co., Sec., Derivative & “ERISA” Litig., No. 1658 (SRC), 2011 
WL 3444199, at *25 (D.N.J. Aug. 8, 2011); In re Stillwater Capital Partners Inc. Litig., 853 F. Supp. 
2d 441, 460 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); In re Pfizer Inc. Sec. Litig., 936 F. Supp. 2d 252, 268–69 (S.D.N.Y. 
2013). As a result, in jurisdictions where the group pleading doctrine had been accepted prior to Janus 
as an appropriate way of satisfying particularity requirements for securities fraud complaints, courts 
have continued to apply it.  
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rule—namely, that the only relevant action was that taken by the final 
decisionmaker, and only that decisionmaker’s scienter could be 
considered.
93
 The majority rejected this argument because it believed that 
the statute imposed organizational liability not only when a single 
employee took an adverse employment action with discriminatory animus, 
but also when an employee, acting with animus, took an intermediate 
action that was intended to, and proximately caused, the adverse action.
94
  
In Janus, by contrast, the Court held that intermediate steps toward 
issuing a false statement do not violate the statute, while in Stoneridge, the 
Court rejected the use of traditional proximate cause to determine whether 
the actions of one person cause a false statement to be issued by another. 
In both cases, the majority reasoned that so long as another decisionmaker 
interpositions itself between the earlier action and the final one, it is that 
decisionmaker—and not the actor who took earlier steps—who is 
responsible for the false statement, even if the final decisionmaker is 
unaware of the earlier actor’s misconduct. In other words, the precise 
reasoning that Staub used to justify imposing liability on an organizational 
employer is reasoning that Janus and Stoneridge have held is inapplicable 
in the context of section 10(b). In fact, the reasoning of Janus and 
Stoneridge is more similar to the rule endorsed by the Staub concurrence, 
which sought to focus attention on the employee with “formal 
decisionmaking authority,” rather than the employees who had acted 
behind-the-scenes.
95
  
Thus, the fact that Staub permitted the scienter of lower level, 
intermediate actors to be imputed to the corporation only by employing 
reasoning that is of at least questionable relevance when applied to section 
10(b) necessarily raises the question whether the same “ultimate authority” 
rule that applies when determining who “made” a statement after Janus 
also applies when determining whose scienter should be imputed to the 
company. This is particularly so given the Staub majority’s apparent 
distrust of imposing liability on a corporation based on aggregation of the 
actus reus of one agent and the scienter of another.
96
  
In fact, it is striking just how far the Supreme Court’s reasoning under 
section 10(b) diverges from the reasoning that previous courts have 
employed to impute scienter to a corporation. For example, in Shortt 
Accountancy, the Ninth Circuit attributed to an accounting firm the mens 
 
 
 93. Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 131 S. Ct. 1186, 1192 (2011). 
 94. Id. 
 95. Staub, 131 S. Ct. at 1195 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 96. Id. at 1191 (majority opinion). 
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rea of a COO who caused the firm to prepare a false tax return, even 
though the COO had not personally signed the return.
97
 In so doing, the 
Ninth Circuit rejected the argument that the COO had not “made” a false 
return, and had at most assisted in the preparation of a false return,
98
 
precisely because it saw no significant difference between aiding a 
violation and actually “making” a tax return, nor did it believe that to 
“make” a return was coextensive with the legal obligation to file one.99 In 
Janus, however, not only did the Court distinguish between “making” a 
false statement and aiding the creation of one, but in so doing, the Court 
relied in part on the fact that only the fund—and not the investment 
adviser—had a statutory duty to file a prospectus.100  
Here, more than the scenario of a guilty management and an innocent 
board of directors, is where the true thirteenth stroke of the clock lies. 
Open-market section 10(b) claims involve official corporate statements, 
which means that under Janus’s rule, they are, at best, “made” only by 
high-level corporate officers and the corporation itself. If the Supreme 
Court has, or is on the verge of, formalizing the approach taken by lower 
courts—that only the scienter of these officers is relevant— then, as a 
practical matter, corporate liability in most section 10(b) cases must be 
derived exclusively from a corporation’s highest management. This 
naturally begs the question whether organizational liability under section 
10(b) is, in fact, based on agency principles at all, or is more properly 
described as “direct,” on the theory that high-level actors represent the 
organization’s “alter ego.”101 
Indeed, even though Janus commands that attributed statements are 
presumed to be “made by—and only by—the party to whom it is 
attributed,”102 lower courts interpreting Janus have freely allowed that 
 
 
 97. 785 F.2d 1448, 1451 (9th Cir. 1986). 
 98. Id. at 1454. 
 99. Id.  
 100. Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2304 (2011). 
 101. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 758 (1998) (citing RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2) (1957) (describing liability based on high-level managers as “direct” 
rather than “vicarious” because top officers are the organization’s alter ego); see also Sharp v. Coopers 
& Lybrand, 649 F.2d 175, 182 n.8 (3d Cir. 1981) (distinguishing “direct” liability, based on the 
highest level agents, from indirect liability based on lower level actors); Nordstrom, Inc. v. Chubb & 
Son, Inc., 54 F.3d 1424, 1435 (9th Cir. 1995) (same). In general, corporate directors—the highest 
source of corporate authority—are not considered to be corporate “agents” of either the corporation or 
its shareholders, because of their unique role in overseeing corporate activities and their lack of direct 
accountability to shareholders. See Arnold v. Soc’y for Sav. Bancorp, Inc., 678 A.2d 533, 539–40 
(Del. 1996); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 cmt. (f)(2) (2006); Deborah A. DeMott, 
Forum-Selection Bylaws Refracted Through an Agency Lens, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 269, 277–78 (2015). 
 102. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2302. 
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multiple high-level actors may be liable for a single false statement, 
regardless of attribution, so long as they had a hand in reviewing or 
approving them,
103
 with corporate liability to follow.
104
 In other words, 
courts are less concerned with the formal rule of Janus—locating a single, 
final authority to whom a statement is attributed—and more concerned 
with seeking a general high level-endorsement of the fraud, demonstrating 
that it is not disaggregation per se that concerns them, but rather the 
notion of permitting section 10(b) liability to be imposed based on the 
actions of lower level actors.
105
 
C. Why the Difference? 
The dramatic difference between the way courts examine section 10(b) 
claims and the way they examine other kinds of federal claims begs an 
 
 
 103. See, e.g., In re Nevsun Res. Ltd., No. 12 Civ. 1845(PGG), 2013 WL 6017402, at *11 n.5 
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2013) (approval of press releases triggers section 10(b) liability; approval of high-
level officers may be presumed at pleading stage pursuant to the group pleading doctrine); In re 
Satyam Computer Servs. Sec. Litig., 915 F. Supp. 2d 450, 477 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (members of the board 
audit committee, along with corporate officers, made statements for Janus purposes); Touchtone Grp., 
LLC v. Rink, 913 F. Supp. 2d 1063, 1079 (D. Colo. 2012) (CFO and Chief Legal Officer jointly had 
ultimate authority); City of Pontiac Gen. Emp.’s Ret. Sys. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 875 F. Supp. 2d 
359, 375 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (high-level nonsignatory is presumed, for pleading purposes, to have shared 
authority over corporate statement with other officers); In re Pfizer Inc. Sec. Litig., 936 F. Supp. 2d 
252, 269 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (evidence that top officers reviewed all press releases is sufficient to render 
them all ultimate authorities). In one case (not involving a fraud-on-the-market claim), where a 
financial advisor innocently repeated information he had been supplied as part of company training, 
the court held the company liable on the theory that corporate executives had overseen the training and 
thus were responsible for the broker’s statements. See Richardson v. Oppenheimer & Co., No. 2:11-cv-
02078-GMN0-PAL, 2014 WL 1304343, at *8 (D. Nev. Mar. 31, 2014).  
 104. In some post-Janus cases, courts have held that when a corporate agent acts with scienter to 
cause a false statement, the corporation may be liable even if the actor is not a “speaker” for Janus 
purposes. Yet, unlike the aggregation cases described in Part II.A, or even the situation in Staub, in 
two of the cases, the actors were quite high-level, thus providing further evidence that as a practical 
matter, courts are imposing organizational liability based on authority. See Curry v. Hansen Medical, 
Inc., No. C 09-5094 CW, 2012 WL 3242447, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2012) (one of only six 
corporate executives); Kerr v. Exobox Techs. Corp, No. H-10-4221, 2012 WL 201872, at *14 (S.D. 
Tex. Jan. 23, 2012) (sole shareholder and, later, 88% controlling shareholder). In Lee v. Active Power, 
Inc., No. A-13-CA-797-SS, 2014 WL 3010679 (W.D. Tex. July 2, 2014), as well as Hansen, higher 
level corporate officers—including the CEO—were also implicated in the fraud, so the scienter of the 
behind-the-scenes employee ultimately was immaterial to corporate liability.  
 105. Though Janus has been applied equally to actions brought by the SEC as to private actions, it 
has more significance to private plaintiffs than to the SEC, for a variety of reasons. First, Stoneridge 
does not apply to SEC actions. SEC v. Richetelli, No. 3:09-cv-361 (CFD), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
68923 (D. Conn. July 12, 2010). Second, the SEC has explicit statutory authority to bring aiding and 
abetting claims. See 15 U.S.C. § 78t(e) (2012). Third, the SEC has a variety of other statutory options 
available to it when lower level employees manipulate corporate statements. See SEC v. Monterosso, 
756 F.3d 1326, 1334 (11th Cir. 2014). Interestingly, however, despite Janus’s application to SEC 
actions, the Fourth Circuit declined to apply Janus to criminal actions. See Prousalis v. Moore, 751 
F.3d 272, 279 (4th Cir. 2014).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss5/7
  
 
 
 
 
2015] SLOUCHING TOWARDS MONELL 1287 
 
 
 
 
inquiry into what it is about the section 10(b) cause of action—and, in 
particular, the context of open-market frauds—that causes courts to resist 
the application of agency principles.  
One answer might simply be that courts doubt the merits of securities 
claims and the usefulness of securities class actions, and thus seek to 
narrow section 10(b) claims. There is a long history of courts deriding 
securities actions as “vexatious,”106 and fraud-on-the-market class actions 
in particular may simply strain courts’ ability to empathize with absent 
plaintiffs. In such cases, most members of the class have not lost enough 
money to justify an individual lawsuit, and the plaintiffs do not even claim 
the dignitary harm that might be associated with traditional fraud 
claims.
107
 
Yet even if this is so, there are three interrelated features of the fraud-
on-the-market action that likely drive these impulses: (1) the fact that 
open-market frauds differ from traditional frauds in ways that challenge 
the usual justifications for vicarious liability; (2) the fact that section 10(b) 
actions have come to resemble criminal actions in terms of their social 
meaning; and (3) the need to distinguish fraud claims from claims that 
appear to be more targeted at the general quality of corporate governance.  
1. Many Instrumental Justifications for Vicarious Liability Do Not 
Apply to Section 10(b) Open-Market Claims 
The first reason why courts are unwilling to look to lower level actors 
when identifying organizational fault is likely that they share the concern 
that commentators have discussed for over a decade: namely, that there is 
a poor fit between the traditional justifications for vicarious liability and 
the unique nature of open-market frauds under section 10(b).  
As explained above, the typical justification for vicarious liability is 
that if the employer reaps the benefits of the agent’s misconduct, that 
employer should also be forced to bear the costs.
108
 But when it comes to 
open-market frauds, the corporation does not obtain the “fruits of 
violations” while externalizing the costs onto the public. The corporation’s 
false statements may influence traders in the secondary market and cause 
them to misvalue the corporation’s securities. But unless the corporation 
itself trades, the corporation does not earn any direct benefit from the 
 
 
 106. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 739 (1975). 
 107. John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Fraud-on-the-Market Tort, 66 VAND. L. 
REV. 1755, 1763–64 (2013). 
 108. See supra notes 25–26 and accompanying text. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
1288 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 92:1261 
 
 
 
 
fraud. Instead, the fraud most directly “benefits” secondary market traders, 
who are presumed to be uninvolved in, and unaware of, the misconduct.
109
 
Indeed, in situations where the corporation most directly benefits—i.e., 
when it issues new securities—the corporation may be subject to liability 
under section 11 of the Securities Act, which imposes strict liability on 
issuers.
110
 At the same time, the persons who are recognized as “injured” 
under section 10(b) are not a separate population, but are the corporation’s 
owners, who suffer when the truth is revealed and the value of their 
investment is diminished.
111
  
The point may stretch even further. Because fraud-on-the-market 
actions are unlikely to compensate investors for their losses, such actions 
today are justified largely in terms of deterrence, as a means of enforcing 
the mandatory disclosure regime of the federal securities laws.
112
 But the 
purposes served by the extensive federal disclosure system go beyond 
merely protecting against fraud, or even ensuring that investors make 
informed choices when buying and selling securities. Instead, mandatory 
 
 
 109. See Donald C. Langevoort, Reading Stoneridge Carefully: A Duty-Based Approach to 
Reliance and Third-Party Liability Under Rule 10b-5, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 2125, 2141–42 (2010). 
Thus, when commentators recommend eliminating entity liability in the section 10(b) context, they 
often make exceptions for situations where the company trades in its own shares. See, e.g., Bratton & 
Wachter, supra note 10, at 75–76; Coffee, supra note 10, at 1556–57. Of course, the story is not quite 
so simple. The lack of direct benefit should not be taken to mean there are no benefits to the 
corporation of any kind; fraud firms may benefit from extensions of credit, both from lenders and 
suppliers, or may have an easier time retaining employees. See Velikonja, supra note 13, at 1925, 
1936. They may also reap intangible benefits from increased prestige, such as greater influence over 
regulators. Cf. Adam Sorensen, JPMorgan’s Other Loss: A Voice for Regulatory Restraint, TIME (May 
14, 2012), http://swampland.time.com/2012/05/14/the-fall-of-jamie-dimon-washingtons-deregulation-
squad-loses-credibility/#ixzz2mYNtVVDH, archived at http://perma.cc/R6GB-HV4U; Danielle 
Douglas & Steven Mufson, JPMorgan Chase CEO Jamie Dimon’s Complicated Relationship with 
Washington, WASH. POST (Nov. 1, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/ 
jpmorgan-chase-ceo-jamie-dimons-complicated-relationship-with-washington/2013/11/01/6806f9d4-
3c3d-11e3-b6a9-da62c264f40e_story.html, archived at http://perma.cc/XBE7-D34A. Moreover, many 
corporations compensate employees with stock and stock options, and thus benefit from fraud in a way 
that may not be immediately obvious just by looking at the corporation’s formal public distributions. 
That said, courts generally perceive fraud-on-the-market scenarios as offering few benefits to the 
corporation itself; they treat situations where there are specific benefits (such as the corporation’s plan 
to affirmatively raise new capital) as departures from the norm warranting a different analysis. See, 
e.g., In re Time Warner Inc. Sec. Litig., 9 F.3d 259, 270 (2d Cir. 1993). 
 110. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (2012). Similarly, section 14 of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n 
(2012), which may come into play when an issuer uses its own artificially-inflated securities to affect 
corporate transactions, has been interpreted by many courts not to require scienter. See, e.g., Beck v. 
Dobrowski, 559 F.3d 680 (7th Cir. 2009); Herskowitz v. Nutri/System, Inc., 857 F.2d 179 (3d Cir. 
1988).  
 111. See Coffee, supra note 10, at 1556–61. As described below, the harms caused by securities 
fraud actually extend far beyond the corporation’s immediate shareholders; however, section 10(b) 
itself does not provide any direct remedy for those injuries. 
 112. See supra notes 10–11 and accompanying text. 
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disclosure improves the allocation of resources across companies, with 
benefits felt across the economy.
113
 Disclosure also facilitates the 
development of a deep and liquid trading market,
114
 which in turn may 
spur growth and innovation.
115
 Corporate disclosures also have an impact 
beyond the investment sphere, providing an important source of financial 
information for employees, competing firms, creditors, suppliers, 
customers, and even government actors making regulatory choices.
116
  
As a result, when issuers disclose information pursuant to federal 
mandate, they are not merely engaged in an activity that generates private 
benefits or even one that prevents harm. They are also contributing to a 
public benefit that operates to improve society as a whole.
117
 Though 
certainly each issuer reaps gains as a result of its access to the developed 
economy generated by such disclosures, on an individual basis, each issuer 
might very well have preferred to remain silent, at least as to some of the 
topics on which disclosure is required.
118
 The more disclosures that 
corporations are obligated to make, the more avenues for private securities 
actions to enforce those obligations,
119
 creating a symbiotic relationship 
between substantive regulation of corporate disclosures and private open-
market section 10(b) actions. The size and scope of these actions, 
facilitated by the fraud-on-the-market doctrine makes them an effective 
regulatory tool. But with damages divorced from compensatory goals, and 
serving mainly a deterrent purpose—and with reporting obligations 
imposed on corporations that go well beyond fraud prevention and instead 
compel them to contribute to an affirmative public good—section 10(b) 
lawsuits stray far afield from the traditional instrumental justifications for 
vicarious liability.  
In other areas of law, when the justifications for vicarious liability 
seem less appropriate, courts and commentators seek forms of “direct” 
liability that locate fault in the organization itself. The most prominent 
example is found within criminal law. It is often argued that civil 
regulatory liability is sufficient to deter corporate misbehavior and to force 
 
 
 113. Fox, supra note 10, at 312; John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Case for a 
Mandatory Disclosure System, 70 VA. L. REV. 717 (1984). 
 114. Fox, supra note 16, at 264. 
 115. JOHN C. COFFEE, JR. & HILLARY A. SALE, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 
8 (12th ed. 2012). 
 116. See Velikonja, supra note 13, at 1933–38, 1945–47. 
 117. See Merritt B. Fox, Retaining Mandatory Securities Disclosure: Why Issuer Choice Is Not 
Investor Empowerment, 85 VA. L. REV. 1335, 1362–63 (1999). 
 118. Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States, 1950–2005: Of 
Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465, 1548 (2007). 
 119. Thompson & Sale, supra note 12, at 904. 
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corporations to internalize the costs of their conduct; thus, an additional 
justification is needed to prosecute a corporation criminally. Typically, 
that justification is described in moral terms—a criminal conviction 
signals a moral judgment by society regarding the egregiousness of the 
corporation’s behavior. In that context, however, agency principles do not 
capture the moral fault associated with criminal liability.
120
 Thus, in the 
criminal context, there have been several proposals to determine liability 
based on fault within the corporation itself, via some fundamental flaw in 
the corporation’s functioning, such as the existence of corporate policies 
and practices that cause the corporation to violate the law.
121
 In practice, 
however, because it is rare for corporations to officially sanction 
lawbreaking, these “direct” forms of liability are often operationalized as 
actions taken by higher level corporate actors. For example, the Model 
Penal Code, variations of which have been adopted by twenty-four 
states,
122
 requires that a corporation’s board of directors or a “high 
managerial agent” have “authorized, requested, commanded, performed or 
recklessly tolerated” the offense before corporate liability may be 
imposed.
123
 High managerial agents appear to be good proxies for 
organizational misconduct because they implement corporate policy; their 
actions may influence those of their subordinates, and they may be 
responsible for a corporate “tone” that encourages fraud.124 Because 
“tone” may be a real phenomenon but is difficult to define in precise 
terms, high managerial fault works as a next-best solution. 
When it comes to section 10(b), courts may well have the same 
impulse as scholars who have criticized vicarious liability in the open-
market fraud context, detecting a mismatch between vicarious liability and 
 
 
 120. Samuel W. Buell, The Blaming Function of Entity Criminal Liability, 81 IND. L.J. 473, 526 
(2006); William S. Laufer, Corporate Liability, Risk Shifting, and the Paradox of Compliance, 52 
VAND. L. REV. 1343, 1366 (1999). Similarly, there is a tradition of limiting vicarious liability when an 
organization confers a public benefit. For example, at common law, charities had only limited liability 
for the acts of their agents; though that immunity has been abrogated by statutes in most states, it still 
persists in certain limited forms. See generally NONPROFIT RISK MGMT. CTR., STATE LIABILITY LAWS 
FOR CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS AND VOLUNTEERS (4th ed. 2001), available at https://www.non 
profitrisk.org/downloads/state-liability.pdf. 
 121. See, e.g., WILLIAM S. LAUFER, CORPORATE BODIES AND GUILTY MINDS: THE FAILURE OF 
CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY (2006); Pamela H. Bucy, Corporate Ethos: A Standard for Imposing 
Corporate Criminal Liability, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1095 (1991). 
 122. See Christopher R. Green, Punishing Corporations: The Food-Chain Schizophrenia in 
Punitive Damages and Criminal Law, 87 NEB. L. REV. 197, 205 (2008). 
 123. Model Penal Code § 2.07(1)(c) (2001). Similarly, twenty-four states have adopted rules that 
in civil lawsuits, punitive damages may only be imposed when a managerial agent authorized the tort, 
or a principal ratified it. See Green, supra note 122, at 208. 
 124. Yair Berson et al., CEO Values, Organizational Culture and Firm Outcomes, 29 J. ORG. 
BEHAV. 615 (2008). 
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the policies that justify it. As a result they have, in practical effect, adopted 
a high-level authority rule that mimics the kinds of rules categorized as 
“direct” liability in other contexts. 
The problem with this approach, however, as has often been observed 
in the criminal context, is that corporate misconduct is often the result of 
incentives and signals obliquely communicated to lower level employees, 
allowing top management to maintain plausible deniability;
125
 a rule that 
focuses only on the actions of higher authorities “is apt to be, in practice, a 
rule of no liability at all.”126 And even when top management is 
uninvolved, lower level employees may still develop corrupt cultures that 
cause significant harm.
127
 For these reasons, states that have adopted the 
Model Penal Code use a definition of “high management” that is very 
forgiving, often allowing anyone deemed an “officer,” or who holds a 
supervisory role, to be equated with the corporation.
128
  
Perhaps sensitive to these concerns, the Model Penal Code has not been 
adopted under federal law, where vicarious liability remains the official 
order of the day. Nonetheless, in the federal system, the search for 
organizational fault has shifted to other phases of the criminal prosecution. 
The U.S. Attorneys’ Manual lists factors that federal prosecutors should 
consider when determining whether to prosecute a corporation, including 
“the pervasiveness of wrongdoing within the corporation, including the 
complicity in, or the condoning of, the wrongdoing by corporate 
management.”129 Similarly, the federal sentencing guidelines direct judges 
to consider markers of corporate culpability when setting penalties, such 
as the participation of high management and “pervasive” tolerance of the 
offense by “substantial authority personnel.”130 Though these are not 
 
 
 125. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Benefit Fin. Co., 275 N.E.2d 33, 82 (Mass. 1971); Bucy, supra 
note 121, at 1105; Buell, supra note 120, at 528–29 (criticizing models of institutional liability that 
focus solely on top management); Laufer, supra note 120, at 1413; John C. Coffee, Jr., “No Soul to 
Damn, No Body to Kick”: An Unscandalized Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 
MICH. L. REV. 386, 398–400 (1981) (recognizing that top management may insulate itself from the 
tactics that lower level employees use to meet corporate expectations). 
 126. Kathleen F. Brickey, Rethinking Corporate Liability Under the Model Penal Code, 19 
RUTGERS L.J. 593, 626 (1988). 
 127. Buell, supra note 120, at 528–29. 
 128. See, e.g., People v. Lanzo Construction Co., 726 N.W.2d 746, 753–54 (Mich. Ct. App. 2006) 
(construction foreman supervising safety on job site); State v. Cmty. Alternatives Mo., Inc., 267 
S.W.3d 735, 745–46 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008) (“lead staff person” for two group homes for mentally 
disabled, employed with a corporation that owned thirty homes); see also Sean Bajkowski & Kimberly 
R. Thompson, Corporate Criminal Liability, 34 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 445, 451 (1997) (the lower 
standard for “high managerial agent” “likely reflects a fear that a strict high managerial agent rule 
would make convictions so difficult that corporate criminal liability would be all but abolished”). 
 129. UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 9-28.300(A)(2) (1997). 
 130. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.5 (2014). 
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liability rules, they do represent an attempt under federal law to impose a 
form of “direct” liability, tied specifically to higher level managers, 
because of the intuition that vicarious liability does not represent a good 
“fit” with criminal law.  
Section 10(b), however, has no such equivalent. Either a company is 
liable for damages attributed to the fraud, or it is not; there is no sliding 
scale of fault. Moreover, private plaintiffs do not exercise the type of 
discretion that would be expected of a public prosecutor; they are not 
likely to determine whether a “policy” has been implemented, but instead 
will naturally try to expand the boundaries of corporate fault so long as 
damages are likely to exceed the costs of litigation. Thus, flexible 
standards are likely to be no standards at all, leaving courts dissatisfied 
with vicarious liability with only the extremely high-level authority rule 
they have, in practice, adopted. 
2. Section 10(b) Has Taken on a More Expressive Role 
Additionally, the mandatory disclosure regime, backed by the threat of 
liability under section 10(b), serves purposes that extend beyond economic 
regulation. The federal securities laws impose disclosure obligations that 
often seem geared toward what scholars have described as corporations’ 
“publicness,” namely, the responsibilities that they owe to the public as a 
result of their power and prominence in American life.
131
 New demands 
have been placed on corporations to conduct themselves as accountable 
not just to their own investors, but to other stakeholders and the public 
generally.
132
 For good or for ill, the federal securities laws have become 
the chief mechanism for accomplishing this, with an increasing number of 
regulations devoted to both ensuring the accuracy and completeness of 
public disclosures, and to forcing disclosure of internal arrangements and 
corporate conduct so as to enable greater public regulation and 
oversight.
133
 Disclosure itself is a mechanism for improving a 
corporation’s conduct as public citizens, by opening up the workings of 
the corporation to public scrutiny.  
As the purposes of disclosure obligations change, so too does the 
meaning of the section 10(b) action. Just as criminal law serves an 
 
 
 131. See, e.g., Hillary A. Sale, Public Governance, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1012, 1013–14 
(2013); Donald C. Langevoort, The Social Construction of Sarbanes-Oxley, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1817, 
1828 (2007); Donald C. Langevoort & Robert B. Thompson, “Publicness” in Contemporary 
Securities Regulation After the JOBS Act, 101 GEO. L.J. 337, 378 (2013). 
 132. See Sale, supra note 131, at 1032–33. 
 133. Id. at 1017–32; Langevoort & Thompson, supra note 131, at 374. 
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expressive purpose—particularly when it comes to organizational 
defendants—section 10(b) actions have taken on an expressive role, both 
to enforce and develop public norms regarding corporate behavior.
134
 
Securities lawsuits can go beyond enforcing existing obligations by 
educating other firms, setting new standards of behavior that can ripple 
through an industry.
135
 Yet, as described above, it is in the realm of 
criminal law that the imposition of vicarious liability is most challenged. 
Accordingly, courts appear to have a corresponding instinct to identify an 
organizational “fault,” which is again interpreted to mean actions taken by 
the policymaking organs of the corporation: its highest managers. 
3. Distinguishing Poor Corporate Governance from Fraud 
Finally, the expansion of section 10(b) has posed a challenge for courts 
regarding the tension between section 10(b)’s doctrinal and practical roles. 
Traditionally, section 10(b) lawsuits and federal securities regulation 
generally have been reserved for regulation of corporate disclosures. 
Internal governance matters have been considered to be matters of state 
concern, and various specific laws, both state and federal, govern 
substantive corporate behavior.
136
 But, as mandatory disclosure 
requirements have increased, the federal securities laws have come to 
resemble a type of “backdoor federalization of state corporation law.”137 
By requiring extensive disclosures regarding a corporation’s financial 
position, its plans, and its trends, the federal securities laws have become a 
mechanism for policing the quality of corporate governance by ensuring 
that managers exercise a certain duty of care,
138
 facilitating informed 
voting by shareholders,
139
 and enhancing the ability of outside directors to 
monitor managerial performance.
140
 The consequence of this regime is that 
 
 
 134. Cox, supra note 11, at 7; Jonathan D. Glater, Hurdles of Different Heights for Securities 
Fraud Litigants of Different Types, 2014 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 47, 61–62 (2014). 
 135. Jared Jennings et al., The Deterrent Effects of SEC Enforcement and Class Action Litigation 
(December 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1868578; see also Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, 
Securities Class Actions as Pragmatic Ex Post Regulation, 43 GA. L. REV. 63, 114 (2008); Cox, supra 
note 11, at 7. 
 136. See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 473–79 (1977). 
 137. Fisch, supra note 16, at 339 (describing the views of Professors Merritt Fox and Laurence 
Mitchell). 
 138. Thompson & Sale, supra note 12, at 903–05. 
 139. Fox, supra note 10, at 311. 
 140. See Thompson & Sale, supra note 12, at 873; see also Gordon, supra note 118, at 1541–61; 
Paul G. Mahoney, Mandatory Disclosure as a Solution to Agency Problems, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1047 
(1995) (arguing that the disclosure regime of the federal securities laws was initially designed to 
combat agency costs). 
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every corporation is at risk of a securities fraud lawsuit if it conceals that 
the business was at least partially reliant on unethical or illegal activity. 
Courts may be limiting the use of vicarious liability principles as a way of 
distinguishing core “fraud” from other forms of corporate misconduct. 
Section 10(b) claims are frequently premised on the allegation that the 
organization secretly engaged in some form of illegal or unethical activity 
unrelated to corporate disclosures, such as anticompetitive conduct;
141
 or 
bribery of foreign officials;
142
 or “kickbacks” to steer business to particular 
companies;
143
 or the misuse of analyst reports to attract IPO business;
144
 or 
off-label drug marketing;
145
 or fraudulent sales of consumer financial 
products.
146
 For these kinds of cases, the false statement that ostensibly 
triggers the section 10(b) violation—typically, a generic attribution of the 
company’s profits to a legitimate business strategy—can seem like a fig 
leaf for a claim that, in truth, is based on corporate managers’ failure to 
properly supervise and direct corporate activities.
147
 By truncating the use 
of vicarious liability, courts set an outer limit on the degree to which 
antisocial corporate behavior can be reformulated into a section 10(b) 
violation.  
Courts accomplish this by drawing sometimes rather strained 
distinctions between the mens rea likely to be harbored by lower level 
actors and the mens rea required for a section 10(b) violation. For 
example, in Nordstrom, the Ninth Circuit expressed doubt that lower level 
agents, such as the personnel director and public relations director, would 
be “aware of the requirements of SEC regulations and state law and of the 
‘danger of misleading buyers and sellers.’”148 Similarly, the Fifth Circuit 
in Zale held that a mid-level executive who falsified internal financial 
results had “acted with the intent to maintain the good appearance of her 
department rather than to defraud investors,” and thus did not harbor the 
kind of scienter required for section 10(b) liability to be imposed on the 
 
 
 141. See, e.g., Chamberlain v. Reddy Ice Holdings, Inc., 757 F. Supp. 2d 683 (E.D. Mich. 2010). 
 142. See, e.g., Glazer Capital Mgmt., LP v. Magistri, 549 F.3d 736 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 143. See, e.g., In re Marsh & Mclennan Cos. Sec. Litig., 501 F. Supp. 2d 452 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
 144. See, e.g., Lapin v. Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc., 506 F. Supp. 2d 221 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
 145. See, e.g., In re Gilead Scis. Sec. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 146. See, e.g., In re Providian Fin. Corp. Sec. Litig., 152 F. Supp. 2d 814 (E.D. Pa. 2001). 
 147. For example, the false statement may be as simple as a representation of “compliance in all 
material respects with all laws,” Glazer, 549 F.3d at 741 (internal quotation marks omitted), which 
seems less likely to truly influence investors than investors’ own background assumptions about the 
regularity of business operations. See generally Alison B. Miller, Note, Navigating the Disclosure 
Dilemma: Corporate Illegality and the Federal Securities Laws, 102 GEO. L.J. 1647 (2014) 
(describing how obligatory disclosures may be rendered false by a failure to disclose uncharged 
criminal activity). 
 148. Nordstrom, Inc. v. Chubb & Son., Inc., 54 F.3d 1424, 1436 (9th Cir. 1995). 
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corporation.
149
 In Plichta v. SunPower Corp.,
150
 the court dismissed a 
complaint alleging that mid-level executives had falsified accounting 
entries, because, in the court’s view, “[t]he question . . . is not whether one 
or more SunPower accounting department employees intended to mislead 
someone when preparing journal entries, but whether the corporation and 
management intended to mislead potential investors when they relied on 
that information and incorporated it in the various SEC filings . . . .”151  
If these decisions are questionable—someone who knowingly 
manipulates internal accounting entries is likely aware that his actions will 
mislead investors, or at least is recklessly indifferent to the possibility—in 
other cases, it may be difficult to distinguish scienter with respect to 
section 10(b) specifically from scienter with respect to other forms of 
corporate misconduct. When lower level actors are responsible for 
antitrust violations or illegal marketing schemes or improper charges to 
vendors, they no doubt hoped to increase the corporation’s bottom line, 
and almost certainly had at least some perception that “the numbers” 
would be publicly reported. In such circumstances, by ignoring lower level 
mens rea, courts avoid the necessity of having to parse the precise nature 
of the lower level actors’ awareness and risk expanding section 10(b) into 
an all-purpose good-corporate-citizen statute.
152
 
 
 
 149. Pipefitters Local No. 636 Defined Benefit Plan v. Zale Corp., 499 Fed. App’x 345, 351 (5th 
Cir. 2012) (unpublished). 
 150. 790 F. Supp. 2d 1012 (N.D. Cal. 2011). 
 151. Id. at 1017; see also Hill v. Tribune Co., Nos. 05 C 2602, 05 C 2927 & 06 C 0741, 2006 WL 
2861016, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 29, 2006), aff’d sub nom. Pugh v. Tribune Co., 521 F.3d 686 (7th Cir. 
2008) (no organizational liability because mid-level officer only harbored scienter to “inflat[e] 
circulation numbers in order to charge higher advertising rates” and not to “deceiv[e] the investing 
public”).  
 152. ECA & Local 134 IBEW Joint Pension Trust of Chi. v. JP Morgan Chase Co., 553 F.3d 187 
(2d Cir. 2009) serves as another example of how courts use scienter on an ad hoc basis to distinguish 
mismanagement cases from fraud cases. The plaintiffs alleged that JP Morgan Chase had defrauded its 
own shareholders by concealing its risky role in the Enron fraud—a role that, when revealed publicly, 
caused a significant drop in JP Morgan’s share price. These allegations are exactly the sort that could 
easily strike a court as being an attack less on JP Morgan’s deceit than on its substantively unethical 
business practices. Nonetheless, the plaintiffs did identify specific false statements: among other 
things, the plaintiffs claimed that JP Morgan helped Enron conceal its outstanding debt by disguising 
loans to Enron as trades, which forced both Enron and JP Morgan to improperly account for the 
transactions. See id. at 194. In rejecting the plaintiffs’ claims, the Second Circuit held that the plaintiffs 
“fail[ed] to show an intent to defraud JPMC’s shareholders rather than Enron’s shareholders.” Id. at 
203. The Second Circuit’s narrow approach to scienter—defining it as an intent to harm a specific 
group of shareholders—stands in sharp contrast to the usual definition, which includes an intent to 
mislead, regardless of whether any harm is intended. See, e.g., In re Level 3 Commc’ns, Inc. Sec. 
Litig., 667 F.3d 1331, 1344 (10th Cir. 2012) (defining scienter as ‘“an intent to deceive or a reckless 
indifference to whether the statements were misleading’” (quoting Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. 
Tellabs, Inc., 513 F.3d 702, 709 (7th Cir. 2008))). 
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Causation has a role to play here, as well. It is precisely because there 
is a relatively distant causal nexus between the lower-level actors’ 
behavior and the ultimate false statement that lower-level actors’ precise 
intentions seem impossible to discern. Thus, it is not surprising that when 
imposing its “supercausation” rule in Stoneridge, the Supreme Court cited, 
among other things, a fear of employing “the federal power . . . to invite 
litigation beyond the immediate sphere of securities litigation and in areas 
already governed by functioning and effective state-law guarantees.”153 
Courts’ curtailment of vicarious liability—that is, their refusal to allow 
lower-level actors’ actions and intentions to be imputed to the 
corporation—served the same purpose even before Stoneridge was 
decided.  
Relatedly, vicarious liability is only supposed to be imposed when the 
agent acts for the principal’s benefit. But employees who filter false 
information up the reporting chain may seem to be doing so to preserve 
their own salaries or jobs, or to obtain bonus payments and other 
undeserved rewards from the corporation. Though these motives are not 
sufficient to defeat the agency relationship as a formal matter,
154
 they may 
still strike courts as suggesting less the intent to mislead investors on the 
corporation’s behalf than the intent to defraud the corporation itself.155 
Once again, the fear that section 10(b) intent cannot be distinguished from 
other kinds of malicious intent when it comes to lower level actors seems 
to be driving courts to adopt the rather blunt approach of simply 
disregarding these actors’ intent entirely.156 
 
 
 153. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atl., Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 161 (2008). 
 154. See FDIC v. Shrader & York, 991 F.2d 216, 223–26 (5th Cir. 1993); Kirschner v. KPMG 
LLP, 938 N.E.2d 941, 951–63 (N.Y. 2010). 
 155. See, e.g., In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 109 F. Supp. 2d 225, 233–34 (D.N.J. 2000) 
(denying motion for summary judgment against corporate defendant: ‘“[A] reasonable trier of fact 
could conclude that the true motive of the wrongdoers was the preservation of their employment, 
salaries, emoluments, and reputations, as well as their liberty, at the expense of [the corporation’s] 
well-being’” (quoting In re Phar-Mor, Inc. Sec. Litig., 900 F. Supp. 784, 787 (W.D. Pa. 1995))); see 
also Buell, supra note 120, at 533:  
The difficult problem of fraud-on-the-market cases suggests a need to develop proper 
baselines for measuring an agent’s intent to benefit her firm. One might view an agent’s 
parity of self-interest with the short-term interests of the firm, but not with the long-term 
interests of the firm, as a case of self-interest, not firm interest. 
cf. Pugh v. Tribune Co., 521 F.3d 686, 698 (7th Cir. 2008) (actions of officer of subsidiary corporation 
could not be imputed to parent because the officer acted to increase wholly-owned subsidiary’s 
income, which the court distinguished from an intent to benefit the parent). 
 156. Notably, in the context of sexual harassment claims under Title VII, the Supreme Court has 
departed from a pure regime of respondeat superior in part because of its distrust that harassers act to 
benefit their employers, rather than out of personal animus or for personal gratification. See Burlington 
Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 756–57 (1998) 
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The problem of identifying whether an agent held the precise mens rea 
required for the offense is not unique to section 10(b), but may be an issue 
in any form of “cat’s paw” liability.157 But because section 10(b) is 
(theoretically) confined to fraud in connection with securities laws, and set 
off from other areas of corporate governance, the problem apparently 
looms large in courts’ concerns. 
4. The Puzzle of Secondary Actors 
Viewing courts’ approach to organizational scienter through this lens 
also helps explain another phenomenon—the fact that a different set of 
rules applies when courts examine the section 10(b) liability of secondary 
actors, such as underwriters and auditing firms. 
After the Central Bank line of cases, secondary actors may only be 
liable when they personally issue false statements or engage in deceptive 
conduct communicated directly to the market, such as when an auditor 
falsely issues a clean audit opinion. Curiously, however, when 
organizational secondary actors are defendants, courts almost never search 
for a single agent whose knowledge may be imputed to the firm, let alone 
a high-level agent; instead, they are willing to gauge the firm’s conduct as 
a whole (or at least the conduct of the particular team assigned to the 
issuer’s account) to determine whether it evidences scienter. As the 
Second Circuit put it in the context of an audit firm defendant, “the 
requisite [organizational] intent exists ‘[w]hen it is clear that a scheme, 
viewed broadly, is necessarily going to injure,’” a standard that would be 
met “where a large entity, firm, institution, or corporation is acting in a 
manner that easily can be foreseen to result in harm.”158 One court even 
 
 
 157. For example, in U.S. ex rel. Harrison v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 352 F.3d 908 
(4th Cir. 2003), the Fourth Circuit held that an organization could be held liable under the False 
Claims Act (FCA) if one employee was aware of a conflict of interest on a government contract, while 
another employee submitted a false certification declaring that no such conflict existed. In the court’s 
view, even though the employee with knowledge of the conflict was unaware of the false certification, 
awareness of the conflict itself constituted sufficiently guilty knowledge to trigger FCA liability, and 
thus was not comparable to aggregating “innocent” knowledge. Harrison v. Westinghouse Savannah 
River Co., 176 F.3d 776, 793 (4th Cir. 1999). In so holding, the court elided the core problem: under 
the FCA, the statutory wrongful conduct was not the conflict, but the false certification. Id. at 919. A 
similar situation arose in Grand Union Co. v. United States, 696 F.2d 888 (11th Cir. 1983). The 
Eleventh Circuit held that the mens rea of grocery store cashiers who accepted foodstamps as payment 
for ineligible items could be combined with the false certification submitted by a different employee 
when determining FCA liability. Id. at 890–91. Although there was evidence that the cashiers were 
aware that they had accepted ineligible items, there was no apparent evidence that the cashiers were 
specifically aware of the false certifications.  
 158. AUSA Life Ins. Co. v. Ernst & Young, 206 F.3d 202, 220, 221 (2d Cir. 2000) (second 
brackets in original) (quoting United States v. Chacko, 169 F.3d 140, 148 (2d Cir. 1999)).  
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went so far as to explicitly hold that the scienter of an audit firm can be 
shown “through a cumulative pattern of decisions and inaction,” even if no 
individual auditor behaves with scienter.
159
 
With this approach, courts are not concerned with the relative rank of 
any particular employee involved in the fraud. To the contrary, courts 
locate scienter not in the mind of any single actor, high-or low-level, but in 
the firm’s overall functioning—exactly the type of “direct” organizational 
liability that theorists have long sought in the criminal context.
160
 
Critically, however, these standards are almost never applied to primary 
actors. They appear to be uniquely associated with secondary actors, even 
in situations where the primary actor also has been “acting in a manner 
that easily can be foreseen to result in harm.”161 
There are two related reasons for this disparate treatment. First, when a 
secondary actor assists with an issuer’s fraud—for example, falsely 
certifying an issuer’s financial statements—there is a direct benefit to that 
actor, in the form of the fees from the issuer and the maintenance of the 
business relationship. Moreover, the harm caused by a secondary actor is 
not to its own shareholders or owners, but to the owners of the issuer, so 
that the secondary actor, much more than the issuer, is externalizing the 
cost of its business onto innocent parties. Thus, the traditional 
justifications for vicarious liability have more of a role to play, which, at 
the very least, likely makes courts less wary of looking to lower level 
actors when identifying organizational fault. Ironically, courts’ disregard 
of employee rank in this context ultimately results in a more holistic view 
of the firm, if only because low-level employees rarely act alone; thus, 
courts’ willingness to consider lower ranking employees when 
 
 
 159. In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 352 F. Supp. 2d 472, 499 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); see also Gould 
v. Winstar Commc’ns, Inc., 692 F.3d 148, 159 (2d Cir. 2012); In re Suprema Specialties, Inc. Sec. 
Litig., 438 F.3d 256, 280–81 (3d Cir. 2006) (scienter alleged against auditing firm; no allegations 
regarding specific auditors); In re MicroStrategy, Inc. Sec. Litig., 115 F. Supp. 2d 620, 656 (E.D. Va. 
2000) (same); In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 241 F. Supp. 2d 281, 360–62 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) 
(scienter alleged against investment banks; no allegations regarding specific personnel). Indeed, in 
New Mexico State Investment Council v. Ernst & Young LLP, 641 F.3d 1089 (9th Cir. 2011), the Ninth 
Circuit explicitly rejected what it called a “right hand, left hand” defense and allowed a section 10(b) 
case to proceed against an auditing firm, regardless of whether the particular personnel who worked on 
the audit were aware of “red flags” that had been communicated to different personnel. Id. at 1099. 
 160. See supra Part II.C.1. 
 161. AUSA Life Ins., 206 F.3d at 221. For example, in Teamsters Local 445 Freight Division 
Pension Fund v. Dynex Capital Inc., the plaintiffs alleged wholesale corruption in the firm’s approach 
to purchasing and securitizing mortgages, yet the Second Circuit held that scienter must exist in the 
mind of a specific culpable agent in order for the firm to be liable under section 10(b). 531 F.3d 190, 
193–95 (2d Cir. 2008). 
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determining the scienter of a secondary-actor organizational defendant 
translates into an evaluation of the firm on a broad scale. 
But this holistic view of the firm highlights an important distinction 
between secondary actors and primary actors: When an auditor or an 
underwriter behaves in a manner that indicates wide-scale corruption, its 
conduct is necessarily aimed directly at investors. Underwriters exist to 
bring securities to the market and auditors exist to communicate with 
investors and provide assurances regarding the quality of issuer earnings. 
Thus, in most cases involving secondary actors, there is no risk of further 
blurring the line between fraud and generalized corporate misconduct. 
When it comes to issuers, however, it is a far more complex task to 
distinguish widespread corruption throughout the organization that is 
specifically aimed at investors from generalized corporate misconduct 
aimed at improving profits.  
III. SECTION 10(B) AND DIRECT ORGANIZATIONAL LIABILITY 
As the above discussion demonstrates, recent Supreme Court 
developments, as well as precedent from the lower courts, strongly suggest 
that the liability of an organizational defendant in an open-market 
section 10(b) action depends solely on the conduct of its highest level 
authorities. Thus, the debate about organizational vicarious liability under 
section 10(b) must be reopened. In the wake of Central Bank, defenders of 
agency liability argued that unlike aiding and abetting liability, which 
imposes liability for conduct the Supreme Court deemed outside the scope 
of the statute, agency liability merely shifts the costs of prohibited conduct 
from the employee to the employer.
162
 But this is not true. To the extent 
there was any doubt, Stoneridge and Janus have made clear that where one 
agent has final authority over a corporate statement, and another harbors 
the relevant mens rea, vicarious liability does not merely cost-shift, but 
creates liability against the corporation that would not exist against either 
employee alone.
 
 
Courts have also justified the continued use of vicarious liability as 
necessary to give effect to statutory provisions that explicitly subject 
organizations to section 10(b).
163
 But this is not true, either: as Professor 
 
 
 162. See AT&T Co. v. Winback & Conserve Program, Inc., 42 F.3d 1421, 1430–31 (3d Cir. 
1994); Prentice, supra note 56, at 1350–51. 
 163. See, e.g., Suez Equity Investors, L.P. v. Toronto-Dominion Bank, 250 F.3d 87, 101 (2d Cir. 
2001); Paul F. Newton & Co. v. Tex. Commerce Bank, 630 F.2d 1111, 1118 (5th Cir. 1980) (citing 
SEC v. Mgmt. Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d 801, 812 (2d Cir. 1975)); In re Centennial Techs. Litig., 52 F. 
Supp. 2d 178, 185 (D. Mass. 1999); see also Prentice, supra note 56, at 1354–55. Courts have also 
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Fischel argued, organizational liability under section 10(b) can be imposed 
directly, via something like an “ultimate authority” rule, in the form of 
authorization by the board of directors.
164
 Significantly, Professor 
Fischel’s argument was rooted in the notion that vicarious liability 
expanded liability beyond what was permitted in section 20(a)—the very 
section that the Supreme Court cited when making a similar argument to 
reject the plaintiffs’ claims in Janus. And in fact, there is precedent for 
imposing direct liability by tying organizational fault to the actions of 
individuals with—as Janus put it—”ultimate authority” to take action. 
That precedent is civil rights litigation against municipal defendants under 
42 U.S.C. § 1983, originally from the Civil Rights Act of 1871.
165
  
A. Organizational Liability Under § 1983 
Section 1983 provides a cause of action to any person who has been 
subjected to a “deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured 
by the Constitution and laws” that occurs “under color of” state law.166 In 
essence, the statute provides a cause of action to victims of civil rights 
violations. In Monell v. Department of Social Services,
167
 the Supreme 
Court held that while municipalities, as well as natural persons, could be 
liable under § 1983, vicarious liability principles would not apply to 
municipalities. Instead, municipalities would be liable only where the 
municipality itself could be said to be responsible for the plaintiff’s injury. 
This would occur, according to the Court, when the injury was inflicted as 
a result of “a government’s policy or custom” as created by “lawmakers or 
by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official 
policy”168 This “policy or custom” test is meant to distinguish acts of 
employees from the acts of the municipality.
169
 
In subsequent cases, the Court elaborated that a government “policy or 
custom” is an official or unofficial action that is traceable to persons who 
 
 
imposed respondeat superior liability on the theory that Congress intended, at the very least, to 
incorporate rights at common law. See, e.g., Commerford v. Olson, 794 F.2d 1319, 1323 (8th Cir. 
1986); Paul F. Newton, 630 F.2d at 1118. In Stoneridge, however, the Supreme Court rejected the use 
of common law to interpret section 10(b)’s scope. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atl., 
Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 162 (2008). 
 164. See Fischel, supra note 51, at 107 n.145.  
 165. Cf. Prentice, supra note 56, at 1348 (highlighting the similarities between Monell and 
Fischel’s proposal). 
 166. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012). 
 167. 436 U.S. 658 (1978). 
 168. Id. at 694. 
 169. Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 481–82 (1986). 
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possess “final authority” to create policy with respect to the designated 
area.
170
 The Court has identified three types of policies or customs on 
which municipal liability may be predicated: officially promulgated “on 
the books” policies (which necessarily will implicate the persons with 
final authority to create policy); individual actions authorized by persons 
who “possess[] final authority to establish municipal policy with respect to 
the action ordered;”171 and unofficial custom, defined to mean “practices 
so persistent and widespread as to practically have the force of law”172 of 
which “[a]ctual or constructive knowledge” may be attributed to persons 
who possess policymaking authority.
173
 As the Supreme Court put it in Jett 
v. Dallas Independent School District,
174
 municipal liability under § 1983 
may be imposed only when final policymaking authorities either “caused 
the deprivation of rights at issue by policies which affirmatively command 
that it occur, or by acquiescence in a longstanding practice or custom 
which constitutes the standard operating procedure of the local 
governmental entity.”175 In other words, municipal liability under § 1983 
bears a striking resemblance to the Janus test, which designates the 
“maker” of a statement as the person with “ultimate authority” over it.  
Though Monell has been described as just another form of respondeat 
superior—”respondeat superior ‘plus,’” in the words of Larry Kramer and 
Alan Sykes
176—it represents a systematic attempt under federal law to 
identify a form of organizational liability distinct from vicarious 
principles. And, similar to Janus, it distinguishes official action from 
unofficial action based on an “ultimate authority” rule.177 Notably, there is 
even a body of case law that applies Monell-style liability standards to 
private corporations: although the issue has come under scholarly fire, 
 
 
 170. Id. at 480–81. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1354 (2011) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 691). 
 173. Nobby Lobby, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 970 F.2d 82, 92 (5th Cir. 1992) (citing Bennett v. City 
of Slidell, 735 F.2d 861, 862 (5th Cir. 1984)).  
 174. 491 U.S. 701 (1989). 
 175. Id. at 737 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 176. See Larry Kramer & Alan O. Sykes, Municipal Liability Under § 1983: A Legal and 
Economic Analysis, 1987 SUP. CT. REV. 249, 254; see also Prentice, supra note 56, at 1417. 
 177. In theory, Monell liability is not terribly dissimilar from the types of liability imposed under 
the Model Penal Code or proposed by various scholars, as described above. That is, the test locates 
“corporate” actions either in the acts of high-level officials or in widespread corporate conduct. 
Nonetheless, the specifics of how Monell is applied in practice differ quite significantly from these 
tests. Most notably, Monell is quite strict about who counts as a “policymaker,” whereas jurisdictions 
that follow the Model Penal Code have defined “high management” very loosely. As Professor 
Achtenberg observed, the test for organizational liability under Monell is unheard-of in any other area 
of law. See Achtenberg, supra note 25, at 2191. 
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most courts agree that when private contractors agree to perform state 
functions (such as run prisons), they may be sued only under standards 
applicable to municipalities, and will only be liable if Monell’s tests are 
satisfied.
178
 Or, to put it another way, contrary to the arguments put forth 
by defenders of vicarious liability in the context of section 10(b), it is not 
true that organizational liability can only be premised on agency 
principles, at least not as those are traditionally understood. 
B. Section 10(b) and § 1983: Similar Means to Similar Ends  
If courts are eliminating vicarious liability in section 10(b) cases 
specifically due to the changing nature and purposes of the section 10(b) 
cause of action, similar motivations have provided the impetus for the 
elimination of vicarious liability under § 1983. 
First, the instrumental justifications for vicarious liability are less 
applicable in the context of actions against municipalities. Local 
governments, unlike private companies, do not receive the “benefits”of 
their activity in the form of profits; thus, the argument that one who 
obtains the economic benefits should also pay the economic costs has less, 
or no, application.
179
 Additionally, the “harms” of misconduct by local 
governments fall on the entity itself (i.e. its own citizens), so that local 
government misconduct is not akin to a business that externalizes the cost 
of operations onto others.
180
 As Professor Frankel explains,  
[T]he fairness rationale for respondeat superior, that the entity that 
enjoys the profits of its employees’ labor also should bear the risk 
of their misconduct, carries less force in the public sector than in the 
private sector. Although in both cases the fairness rationale supports 
providing full compensation for an injured victim, public entities 
are not motivated by profit, and it is the general populace that 
 
 
 178. See, e.g., Johnson v. Karnes, 398 F.3d 868, 877 (6th Cir. 2005); Austin v. Paramount Parks, 
Inc., 195 F.3d 715, 729 (4th Cir. 1999); see also Richard Frankel, The Failure of Analogy in 
Conceptualizing Private Entity Liability Under Section 1983, 78 UMKC L. REV. 967 (2010); Barbara 
Kritchevsky, Civil Rights Liability of Private Entities, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 35 (2004). 
 179. Myriam E. Gilles, In Defense of Making Government Pay: The Deterrent Effect of 
Constitutional Tort Remedies, 35 GA. L. REV. 845, 863–67 (2001) (arguing that, given the different 
incentives faced by government actors, the restrictions on vicarious liability imposed by Monell are 
well-calculated to ensure that constitutional tort lawsuits have a deterrent effect); Richard Frankel, 
Regulating Privatized Government Through § 1983, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1449, 1484–92 (2009) 
(describing the ways that governments may not respond to ordinary tort incentives the same way that 
private, wealth-maximizing firms do).  
 180. Kramer & Sykes, supra note 176, at 278–79.  
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ultimately benefits from the labor of government employees rather 
than a group of private investors or shareholders.
181
 
Similarly, for open-market section 10(b) frauds, no direct benefits accrue 
to the corporation (unless it simultaneously trades in its own securities), 
and the harms (at least, those compensable by the section 10(b) action) fall 
upon the corporation’s own shareholders, i.e., members of the corporate 
“polity.”  
To be sure, neither statute is quite so simple. For example, in the 
§ 1983 context, some types of civil rights violations may fall unequally on 
certain members of the polity (the poor, racial minorities, etc), or even on 
persons who are not members of the polity at all (immigrants), which may 
incentivize some voters to externalize costs at the expense of others.
182
 
Similarly, in the section 10(b) context, shareholders who trade during the 
fraud period may actually benefit from the fraud, while shareholders who 
maintain their holdings ultimately bear its costs.
183
 Nonetheless, both 
causes of action challenge the traditional justifications for vicarious 
liability in ways that make it easy to infer that courts are driven by similar 
policy impulses in the two contexts. 
Second, the obligations imposed on municipalities are intended to 
benefit the general public; they are governmental responsibilities with 
benefits felt throughout the polity. Similarly, the disclosure obligations 
now imposed on corporations have also taken on a quasi-governmental 
character that is intended to both benefit the general public and expose the 
corporation’s operations to public scrutiny.184 As described above, 
disclosure duties are imposed not simply to protect the corporation’s 
security holders, but to improve the functioning of the “real economy,”185 
and to force corporations to adhere to norms of “social legitimacy” due to 
their power and role in society.
186
 In other words, in exchange for gaining 
access to public financing, corporations are required to shoulder certain 
responsibilities—the responsibilities of disclosure, paired with 
section 10(b) liability—that have public purposes: to improve market 
 
 
 181. Frankel, supra note 179, at 1490. 
 182. Kramer & Sykes, supra note 176, at 279. 
 183. Such “holding” shareholders not only suffer as a result of the fraud itself, but also bear the 
costs of liability for a suit to which they do not have standing to bring a claim. See Blue Chip Stamps 
v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).  
 184. Langevoort & Thompson, supra note 131, at 374; Sale, supra note 131, at 1032–34. 
 185. Merritt B. Fox, Retaining Mandatory Securities Disclosure: Why Issuer Choice Is Not 
Investor Empowerment, 85 VA. L. REV. 1335, 1415 (1999); see also John C. Coffee, Jr., Market 
Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory Disclosure System, 70 VA. L. REV. 717, 722 (1984). 
 186. Langevoort & Thompson, supra note 131, at 378. 
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functioning, to improve allocations of resources across the economy, and 
to allow for public scrutiny and control.
187
 Corporations are thus 
increasingly treated—like municipalities—as public, rather than private 
actors.
188
  
Finally, and most strikingly, in the § 1983 context, limitations on 
vicarious liability are used as a pressure point to effect a more substantive 
limitation, namely, to distinguish constitutional violations (a matter of 
federal concern) from ordinary torts (which are reserved for state law), just 
as limitations on vicarious liability in the section 10(b) context are used to 
distinguish governance claims (a matter of state concern) from federal 
fraud. This is not facially evident from § 1983 doctrine itself—that 
doctrine requires that there be a constitutional violation before any inquiry 
can be made into a municipality’s liability for it189—but as a practical 
matter, the motivation for limiting municipalities’ vicarious liability 
appears to have been borne of a desire to distinguish matters of 
constitutional concern from garden-variety state tort matters.  
To see why, it is necessary to trace the history of municipal liability 
under § 1983. In Monroe v. Pape,
190
 the Supreme Court held that local 
governments were not “persons” for the purposes of the statute, and thus 
were immune from liability.
191
 At the same time, the Court held that even 
unauthorized actions by government actors are taken “under color of law” 
for statutory purposes, and thus may form the basis of a claim against the 
actor individually.
192
 The Court reasoned that any other interpretation 
would allow states to disclaim responsibility for widespread, but informal, 
policies of violating federal rights.
193
  
Justice Frankfurter dissented. He believed that unauthorized torts 
committed by state actors could be dealt with satisfactorily within the 
confines of state tort law.
194
 Rather than adopt a prophylactic policy of 
allowing even unauthorized torts committed by state actors to form the 
basis of a claim, he believed that § 1983—and thus federal law—should 
only be invoked where it could be shown that a formal or informal state 
policy permitting or immunizing the offending conduct blocked the 
 
 
 187. Fox, supra note 10, at 310–13 (market functioning); Gordon, supra note 118, at 1508 
(resource allocation); Sale, supra note 131, at 1032–34 (public scrutiny and control). 
 188. Sale, supra note 131, at 1032; Langevoort, supra note 131, at 1829. 
 189. See Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 120 (1992). 
 190. 365 U.S. 167 (1961). 
 191. Id. at 187. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. at 173–74. 
 194. Id. at 239 (1961) (Frankfurter, J. dissenting). 
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plaintiff from obtaining redress under local law.
195
 In Justice Frankfurter’s 
view, the extension of § 1983 to torts for which states could and did 
fashion local remedies “makes the extreme limits of federal constitutional 
power a law to regulate the quotidian business of every traffic policeman, 
every registrar of elections, every city inspector or investigator, every 
clerk in every municipal licensing bureau in this country.”196 
In Monell, the Supreme Court reversed Monroe v. Pape’s holding that 
local governments were immune from liability under § 1983.
197
 At the 
same time, however, it held that local governments would not be 
vicariously liable for the unauthorized torts of their agents, and instead, 
would only be liable for actions taken pursuant to an official policy or 
custom.
198
 In so doing, the Court, in practical effect, “adopt[ed] the very 
limitation on municipal liability for section 1983 actions that Justice 
Frankfurter, in his Monroe dissent, had advocated to be applied to all 
government-level liability.”199 In other words, the Court used the doctrines 
of vicarious and direct organizational liability to accomplish what Justice 
Frankfurter had earlier urged: to draw a distinction between matters fit for 
local regulation and matters of federal constitutional concern. Professor 
David Achtenberg points out that this was no accident: Justice Powell, the 
swing Justice in Monell, sought the restrictions on vicarious liability 
precisely because he believed that Justice Frankfurter had the better of the 
argument in Monroe.
200
  
 
 
 195. Id. at 235. 
 196. Id. at 242. 
 197. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). 
 198. Id. at 690–91. 
 199. Paul F. Wingenfeld, Note, Section 1983 and the Parratt Doctrine After Zinermon v. Burch: 
Ensuring Due Process or Turning the Fourteenth Amendment into a ‘Font of Tort Law,’ 39 CLEV. ST. 
L. REV. 445, 452 (1991). 
 200. David Jacks Achtenberg, Frankfurter’s Champion: Justice Powell, Monell, and the Meaning 
of “Color of Law,” 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 681, 682 (2011); see also Jones v. Preuit & Mauldin, 851 
F.2d 1321, 1336–38 (11th Cir. 1988) (Vance, J., dissenting) (citing rejection of vicarious liability for 
municipalities as one of several methods that the Supreme Court has used to attempt to distinguish 
constitutional torts from ordinary torts); Christina B. Whitman, Government Responsibility for 
Constitutional Torts, 85 MICH. L. REV. 225, 247–48 (1986) (“The effort to distinguish constitutional 
torts from ordinary torts has led, in suits against individuals, to an insistence that the wrong be 
somehow more egregious than that ordinarily remedied through tort. That requirement has been 
carried over to suits against institutions, where an additional effort to distinguish constitutional torts 
has led to the rejection of vicarious liability.”); Susan Bandes, Monell, Parratt, Daniels, and Davidson: 
Distinguishing a Custom or Policy from a Random, Unauthorized Act, 72 IOWA L. REV. 101, 104 
(1986) (explaining that, properly interpreted, Monell’s rejection of vicarious liability, coupled with the 
definition of due process set forth in other cases, work together to “provide an accurate way of 
relegating common-law tort claims to state court, while preserving the federal forum for constitutional 
violations by the state”). The Supreme Court has tacitly admitted that its conception of “direct” 
municipal liability under Monell is intended to distinguish matters of constitutional concern from 
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This is, of course, precisely what appears to motivate courts in the 
section 10(b) context. Just as with § 1983, courts focus on the conduct of 
higher level actors as a mechanism for distinguishing garden-variety 
mismanagement (a matter of state law concern) from federal securities 
fraud.
201
  
To be sure, federalism concerns have a different tenor in the § 1983 
context as compared to the section 10(b) context. In the § 1983 context, 
there is a special solicitude for the states’ autonomous decisions regarding 
the hiring and regulation of their own agents that is not present under 
section 10(b). Under both statutes, however, federalism has a dimension 
tied to efficiency—the sense that local regulators can make more informed 
choices, with greater room for tailoring and experimentation, than can the 
more distant federal government.
202
 That concern is reflected in the 
interpretations of both statutes. 
In fairness, there are several reasons why one might argue that Monell-
style liability is inappropriate for section 10(b) litigation. Central Bank 
encouraged courts to interpret the statute by reference to how Congress 
would have decided the question when the Act was passed,
203
 and 
respondeat superior liability was a “well-understood workhorse[] of 
business law” in 1934.204 Similarly, when the 1975 Congress reworded the 
definition of “person” in the Exchange Act and reaffirmed its application 
to organizations,
205
 it could not have expected that organizational liability 
 
 
matters better left to state regulation. As the Court explained in Board of County Commissioners of 
Bryan County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397 (1997), “[a] failure to apply stringent culpability and causation 
requirements [to distinguish direct from vicarious municipal liability] raises serious federalism 
concerns, in that it risks constitutionalizing particular hiring requirements that States have themselves 
elected not to impose.” Id. at 415.  
 201. See supra Part II.C.3; cf. Nat Stern, The Constitutionalization of Rule 10b-5, 27 RUTGERS 
L.J. 1 (1995) (recognizing that under both section 10(b) and in a variety of areas of constitutional law, 
the Supreme Court defines substantive rights in part by reference to whether state law provides an 
alternative remedy). 
 202. Experimentation and decentralization have often been touted as one of the virtues of 
federalism. See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) (federalism “assures a 
decentralized government that will be more sensitive to the diverse needs of a heterogenous society; it 
increases opportunity for citizen involvement in democratic processes; it allows for more innovation 
and experimentation in government; and it makes government more responsive by putting the States in 
competition for a mobile citizenry.”). In the corporate context, the ability of states to “compete” for 
charters and to innovate in the development of the law is often touted as one of the law’s greatest 
strengths. See, e.g., Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the 
Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 290 (1977). 
 203. Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 173 
(1994). 
 204. Donald C. Langevoort, Agency Law Inside the Corporation: Problems of Candor and 
Knowledge, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 1187, 1228 (2003). 
 205. See supra note 6. 
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would depend on a doctrine that would not exist for another three years. In 
1995, when Congress passed the PSLRA and dealt directly with the 
conduct of private suits, vicarious liability had been accepted in a majority 
of the circuits.
206
 If anything, the 1995 Congress believed that the mens rea 
of a nonspeaking actor would be combined with the mens rea of the 
speaker, because it passed a special rule preventing such aggregation only 
in a specific circumstance: when the statement qualifies as “forward-
looking,” and thus is subject to special protections.207 Finally, though the 
Supreme Court has held that the private section 10(b) action ought to be 
given a “narrow” construction due to its origin as an implied right of 
action,
208
 the Court has also acknowledged that the PSLRA “ratified the 
implied right of action,”209 which counsels in favor of at least looking to 
1995 jurisprudence when interpreting the statute. In 1995, Congress could 
barely have understood how Central Bank would be interpreted,
210
 let 
alone have predicted the adoption of a “final authority” rule for assessing 
corporate liability.
211
 
That said, it is difficult to avoid noticing the similarities between 
Monell and Janus jurisprudence, as well as the contextual similarities 
outlined above. Though Monell on first blush appears to be rooted in the 
language of § 1983 and its particular legislative history,
212
 in fact, § 1983 
has been interpreted more as a source of authorization for federal common 
 
 
 206. See Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 1564, 1576 n.27 (9th Cir. 1990) (en banc) 
(citing cases).  
 207. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5 (2012).  
 208. Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2302 (2011) (citing 
Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atl., Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 167 (2008)). 
 209. Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 165. The PSLRA provides that the statute shall not be “deemed to 
create or ratify any implied private right of action,” Pub. L. No. 104-67 § 203 (1995), but this 
statement is of dubious validity given the design of the statute. See Robert A. Prentice, Stoneridge, 
Securities Fraud Litigation, and the Supreme Court, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 611, 671–73 (2008) (concluding 
that the PSLRA’s no-ratification provision is nonsensical). Moreover, even after the PSLRA, in 2002, 
Congress “ratified” the private right of action when it expanded the statute of limitations in the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 804, 116 Stat. 745, 801, an action that would be 
meaningless if there existed no private right of action to limit. At no time could Congress have 
anticipated that the Supreme Court would eliminate vicarious liability principles for determining 
corporate liability. Indeed, even in 1993, two years before the enactment of the PSLRA, the Supreme 
Court recognized that Congress had acknowledged and acquiesced in the section 10(b) private right of 
action. See Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Emp’rs Ins., 508 U.S. 286, 293–94 (1993). 
 210. See Prentice, supra note 209, at 648–49, 674. 
 211. Notably, however, by redefining the word “make” in Janus, the Court adopted an 
interpretation that was completely different—and far narrower—than any that had existed before, 
suggesting that the Court is not overly concerned with maintaining the 1995 boundaries of the private 
right of action.  
 212. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691–94 (1978); see also Prentice, supra note 
56, at 1348. 
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law rulemaking,
213
 precisely as jurisprudence under section 10(b) has 
developed.
214
 After Stoneridge and Janus, it is plain that the Supreme 
Court has come a long way from interpreting section 10(b) in light of 
Congress’s intent; instead, in private actions, the Court seems committed 
to adopting narrowing constructions whenever possible.
215
 
It is also significant that under the Monell “final policymaking 
authority” rule, liability under § 1983 may be triggered when the 
policymaker delegates his or her authority to another official, who then 
creates a policy in violation of federal law.
216
 That was also the approach 
taken by Justice Alito in his Staub concurrence. Although he believed that 
only the actions of the person with “formal decisionmaking authority” 
could be considered when determining organizational liability, he agreed 
that where that person delegates that authority by “rubberstamp[ing]” the 
decisions of another, the delegatee becomes the new decisionmaker.
217
 
Because it is difficult to quarrel with the notion that boards of directors 
delegate authority to operate the corporation to its highest officers,
218
 a 
Monell-style form of corporate liability does not, as Justice Breyer feared, 
depend solely on the conduct of the board of directors. Instead, it 
additionally permits the imposition of corporate liability based on the 
conduct of its highest level officers. Which is, as described above, 
precisely how district courts have interpreted Janus.
219
 
Finally, it is worth noting that both § 1983 and section 10(b) offer 
significant protections to individual defendants, as well as organizations. 
Section 10(b), of course, has been so narrowly defined under Central Bank 
and its progeny that most lower level employees who cause a corporation 
 
 
 213. Michael J. Gerhardt, The Monell Legacy: Balancing Federalism Concerns and Municipal 
Accountability Under Section 1983, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 539, 541 (1989). 
 214. Edward A. Fallone, Section 10(b) and the Vagaries of Federal Common Law: The Merits of 
Codifying the Private Cause of Action Under a Structuralist Approach, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 71, 95; cf. 
Stern, supra note 201, at 3 (arguing that the Supreme Court interprets section 10(b) in a manner 
resembling its interpretation of constitutional provisions). 
 215. See Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2302 (2011) (“We 
must give ‘narrow dimensions . . . to a right of action Congress did not authorize when it first enacted 
the statute and did not expand when it revisited the law.’” (quoting Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. 
Scientific-Atl., Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 167 (2008))). 
 216. See City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 126–27 (1988).  
 217. See Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 131 S. Ct. 1186, 1195 (2011) (Alito, J., concurring in the 
judgment).  
 218. See Thompson & Sale, supra note 12, at 877–78; Lawrence E. Mitchell & Theresa A. 
Gabaldon, If I Only Had a Heart: Or, How Can We Identify a Corporate Morality, 76 TUL. L. REV. 
1645, 1657–58 (2002). As Thompson and Sale point out, federal law increasingly imposes corporate 
governance duties directly on management, not the board of directors. See Thompson & Sale, supra 
note 12, at 878.  
 219. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.  
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to issue misstatements are immune from private liability. Meanwhile, 
under § 1983, various immunity rules significantly limit the liability of 
individual tortfeasors.
220
  
IV. MONELL AS APPLIED TO SECTION 10(B)—IMPLICATIONS AND 
PROBLEMS 
If courts examining section 10(b) claims are slouching towards a 
Monell-like form of organizational liability, and are doing so for similar 
policy reasons, it is worth examining how this form of liability can—or 
should—be applied to section 10(b) claims. As it turns out, despite the 
criticisms that the Monell doctrine has received from various scholars,
221
 
there are some ways that a Monell-style analysis seems to be a better “fit” 
with section 10(b) claims than it does with § 1983 claims. Moreover, there 
are areas of Monell doctrine where application of Monell-style rules may 
help clarify the law with respect to section 10(b). 
A. The Scope of the Final Authority Rule 
It is too soon to tell whether courts examining section 10(b) claims will 
find themselves embroiled in the same kinds of disputes over the identity 
of the “final policymaker” that have engulfed § 1983 claims. In § 1983 
litigation, the “final authority” rule is quite strict, focusing on formal 
rather than practical authority. As a result, as Justice Breyer pointed out, 
attempting to distinguish decisions that emanate from final policymaking 
authority from other sorts of decisions is a hopeless task, requiring courts 
to “spin ever finer distinctions . . . between liability that rests upon policy 
and liability that is vicarious.”222 In the context of section 10(b), however, 
courts appear to be more forgiving than the Monell rule would formally 
allow. They generally recognize that many high-level officers and 
corporate directors may be ultimate authorities, with shared responsibility 
 
 
 220. See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 637–38 (1980). 
 221. See, e.g., Barbara E. Armacost, Organizational Culture and Police Misconduct, 72 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 453 (2004); George D. Brown, Municipal Liability Under Section 1983 and the 
Ambiguities of Burger Court Federalism: A Comment on City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle and 
Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati—The “Official Policy” Cases, 27 B.C. L. REV. 883, 884 (1986); 
Kramer & Sykes, supra note 176, at 294; Prentice, supra note 56, at 1418; Harold S. Lewis, Jr. & 
Theodore Y. Blumoff, Reshaping Section 1983’s Asymmetry, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 755, 797 (1992); 
Peter H. Schuck, Municipal Liability Under Section 1983: Some Lessons from Tort Law and 
Organization Theory, 77 GEO. L.J. 1753 (1989). 
 222. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 430 (1997) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting). 
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for corporate documents (thus avoiding delicate questions about whether 
one high-level actor’s authority “trumps” another’s), and that individuals 
are ultimate authorities for their own statements.
223
 This approach is 
arguably at odds with Janus’s rather strict, Monell-like admonition that a 
statement is usually “made by—and only by—the party to whom it is 
attributed,”224 but is certainly more practical than Monell’s “there can be 
only one” approach.225  
Issues may arise when one considers that Janus’s attribution rule is, 
according to the Supreme Court, only evidence of “ultimate authority,” not 
proof.
226
 Thus, even attributed statements may not have been “made” by 
the persons to whom they are attributed. For example, in SEC v. 
Daifotis,
227
 evidence showed that it was common practice at Charles 
Schwab for the client management division to invent the quotes contained 
in corporate advertisements.
228
 In Tyson Foods, the press release that 
formed the basis of the plaintiffs’ claims included a quote attributed to the 
CEO “which was never made or expressly approved by him.”229 Under 
such circumstances, courts will have to determine whether authority has 
 
 
 223. See supra note 103 and accompanying text; see also Local 703, I.B. of T. Grocery & Food 
Emp.’s Welfare Fund v. Regions Fin. Corp., No. CV: 10-2847-IPJ, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93873, at 
*3 (N.D. Ala. Aug. 23, 2011) (CEOs and CFOs are ultimate authorities over documents they certify); 
In re Merck & Co., Sec., Derivative & “ERISA” Litig., No. 1658 (SRC), 2011 WL 3444199, at *25 
(D.N.J. Aug. 8, 2011) (corporate officer is ultimate authority over his own statements to the market, 
and documents he signed).  
 224. Janus, 131 S.Ct. at 2302. 
 225. Courts have not, however, become so lenient as to mimic the “high management” tests 
employed by states for corporate criminal liability under variations of the Model Penal Code. As 
described above, under state law, even relatively low-level managers may trigger corporate-wide 
liability. Thus far, section 10(b) courts appear to hold a slightly larger group of officers liable than 
Monell would permit for “making” statements, but they still limit liability to a fairly circumscribed 
group of top management/directorial level agents. For mid-level actors—typically those who clearly 
report to more senior personnel—courts have had no trouble holding that they are not “final” 
authorities for Janus purposes. See, e.g., In re Miller Energy Res. Sec. Litig., No. 3:11-CV-386-TAV-
CCS, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15810 (E.D. Tenn. Feb. 4, 2014) (President and Vice-Chair); SEC v. 
Mercury Interactive, LLC, No. 5:07-cv-02822-WHA, 2011 WL 5871020, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 
2011) (corporate general counsel); SEC v. Kelly, 817 F. Supp. 2d 340, 343 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (Vice 
President of Accounting Policy); Touchtone Grp., LLC v. Rink, 913 F. Supp. 2d 1063 (D. Colo. 2012) 
(controller). And where a particular officer takes direction from a higher level one, the lower level 
officer is not deemed “maker” of a statement. See, e.g., Rink, 913 F. Supp. 2d at 1078–79; Haw. 
Ironworkers Annuity Trust Fund v. Cole, No. 3:10 CV 371, 2011 WL 3862206, at *5 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 
7, 2011). 
 226. Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2302 (2011) 
(attribution that is explicit or “implicit from surrounding circumstances is strong evidence” of who 
made the statement). 
 227. 874 F. Supp. 2d 870 (N.D. Cal. 2012). 
 228. See id. at 877. 
 229. In re Tyson Foods, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. Civ. A. 01-425-SLR, 2004 WL 1396269, at *6 (D. 
Del. June 17, 2004).  
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been “delegated” from the named actor to another, as both Monell and 
Justice Alito’s Staub concurrence envision. The standards to establish 
delegation under Monell are extraordinarily stringent; even an agent 
granted discretion to act, and whose actions are not reviewed by any other 
person, may still not be deemed a “policymaker” if her discretion is 
(nominally) constrained by policies promulgated by a higher authority.
230
 
However, Justice Alito’s Staub concurrence suggested a more forgiving 
notion of delegated authority; it remains to be seen how courts will 
examine the issue in the section 10(b) context. 
That said, for most corporate communications, identifying the 
“ultimate authority” may present a less complex problem under section 
10(b) than it does for § 1983. Section 10(b) claims are almost always 
premised on corporate communications, presenting courts with a fairly 
uniform set of determinations, unlike the many different fact patterns that 
courts are forced to confront under § 1983. Moreover, unlike local 
governments, publicly traded corporations are subject to a uniform set of 
disclosure rules set by the SEC, which include requirements that certain 
public filings be signed or certified by particular corporate officers and 
directors.
231
 Additionally, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and implementing 
regulations impose stringent duties on registered companies regarding 
their internal control and compliance systems, which may also provide a 
source of information for determining the “ultimate authority” for any 
given statement.
232
   
 
 
 230. See City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 130 (1988) (the mere fact that higher level 
officials failed to review personnel decisions of lower level officials does not establish delegation); 
Darchak v. City of Chi. Bd. of Educ., 580 F.3d 622, 629–30 (7th Cir. 2009) (same). 
 231. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13a-14 (2014); SEC Form 10-K, General Instructions, Part D. 
Complications are more likely to arise when the defendant is not a publicly traded corporation 
(although in such circumstances, the defendant could almost certainly not be a primary actor in a 
fraud-on-the-market claim). For instance, in SEC v. KPMG LLP, 412 F. Supp. 2d 349 (S.D.N.Y. 
2006), the court anticipated Janus by holding that audit opinions are only “made” by the audit partner 
with “ultimate authority” to issue them. Under KPMG internal rules, as well as guidelines issued by 
the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, audit opinions were the responsibility of the 
engagement partner, but required an additional review by a “concurring review partner.” Id. at 376. 
Performing a balancing test, the court concluded that due to the more limited scope of the concurring 
partner’s responsibilities, he could not be said to have “made” the statements in the audit opinion—an 
obviously discretionary decision that makes it difficult to predict how future cases will be determined. 
Id. at 377.  
 232. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.307, 229.308, 229.601 (2013); 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-15 (2014).  
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B. The Role of “Deliberate Indifference” 
Where § 1983 can provide the most guidance to section 10(b) is in 
situations where the wrongdoing was not directly authorized by the “final” 
policymaker, but instead the policymaker is deemed “deliberately 
indifferent” to the risk of harm. 
As described above, § 1983 allows municipal liability to be imposed 
based on the direct actions of final policymakers—the promulgation of 
official policies, acts taken directly under their orders, and so forth. But it 
also allows liability to be imposed when a lower level actor commits a 
constitutional tort, and the policymaker acts with “deliberate indifference” 
toward the risk. For example, if the lower level actor behaves in 
accordance with a widespread “custom”—defined to mean a convention 
that, although “not formally approved by an appropriate decisionmaker is 
so widespread as to have the force of law”233—municipal liability will be 
imposed if the policymaker had “actual or constructive” knowledge of the 
custom
234
 and displayed “deliberate indifference” to the risk the custom 
posed.
235
 Critically, both the “constructive knowledge” inquiry, and the 
“deliberate indifference” inquiry, represent objective evaluations regarding 
the proper standard of behavior; they do not depend on the policymaker’s 
subjective mens rea. Knowledge of the custom may be imputed when the 
custom is “so widespread or flagrant that in the proper exercise of its 
official responsibilities the governing body should have known of 
them.”236 “Deliberate indifference” requires the court to assess whether the 
municipality “knew or should have known” of the risk.237  
Similar standards apply when the plaintiff alleges that a constitutional 
injury was the result of the municipality’s “failure to train” its actors, or its 
 
 
 233. B.S. v. Somerset Cnty., 704 F.3d 250, 274 (3d Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 234. Miller v. Kennebec Cnty., 219 F.3d 8, 12 (1st Cir. 2000); Pineda v. City of Houston, 291 
F.3d 325, 328 (5th Cir. 2002). 
 235. Baker v. District of Columbia, 326 F.3d 1302, 1306-07 (D.C. Cir. 2003).  
 236. Spell v. McDaniel, 824 F.2d 1380, 1387 (4th Cir. 1987); see id. at 1391 (“Constructive 
knowledge may be inferred from the widespread extent of the practices, general knowledge of their 
existence, manifest opportunities and official duty of responsible policymakers to be informed, or 
combinations of these.”); Myriam E. Gilles, Breaking the Code of Silence: Rediscovering “Custom” in 
Section 1983 Municipal Liability, 80 B.U. L. REV. 17, 82 (2000) (“[A]s a practical matter, a showing 
that a pervasive pattern of conduct exists, is generally sufficient to satisfy the requirement that high-
ranking officials ‘knew of, or should have known’ of the complained-of practice”). 
 237. Baker, 326 F.3d at 1306–07; see also Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 840–41 (1994). 
These standards are comparable to common law standards for holding an employee liable for ultra 
vires acts that are ratified or endorsed by his employer. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY 
§ 219(2)(b) (1958) (the master is liable for acts of an agent that exceed the scope of employment 
where “the master was negligent or reckless”). 
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negligence in hiring. In each case, the plaintiff must show a policymaker’s 
objective deliberate indifference to the risk of harm.
238
 These standards 
hold even when the constitutional tort (like section 10(b)) is one that 
requires mens rea.
239
 In such circumstances, if the lower level actor 
harbors the relevant mens rea, the policymaker need only be objectively 
deliberately indifferent to the risk before municipal liability may be 
imposed. 
As the Supreme Court has acknowledged, this type of liability serves to 
fill the gap that might otherwise be created by the “final authority” rule, to 
prevent attempts to “insulate the government from liability simply by 
delegating their policymaking authority to others.”240 As discussed above, 
when organizational liability is premised only on the actions of higher 
authorities, those authorities may formally order compliance with the law 
while tacitly rewarding employees who break it.
241
 Thus, by holding 
municipalities responsible for injuries caused by their objective deliberate 
indifference to the conduct of lower level employees, the Supreme Court 
has recognized that any theory of organizational liability distinct from 
respondeat superior is incomplete if it is limited solely to the subjective 
knowledge and mens rea of the organization’s highest authorities.  
It is here that section 10(b) courts could be most usefully guided by 
Monell jurisprudence. Just as in the § 1983 context, if organizational 
liability for section 10(b) violations must ultimately be traceable to 
“ultimate authorities,” there should be a “gap-filler” that prevents those 
authorities from simply blinding themselves to the behavior of their 
subordinates. Cases brought under section 10(b) have alleged, for 
example, widespread intentional accounting fraud at corporate 
subsidiaries,
242
 various forms of mortgage fraud by individual brokers and 
underwriters,
243
 extensive off-label drug marketing,
244
 and bribery of 
 
 
 238. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 840–41, 847; Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 
397, 407 (1997). 
 239. Such as “subjective” deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s safety in violation of the Eighth 
Amendment (defined to mean that the prison official is actually aware of, and disregards, a substantial 
risk of serious harm to the inmate), Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842, or an intent to discriminate under the 
Equal Protection Cause, Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239–40 (1976). 
 240. City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 126 (1988). 
 241. See text accompanying supra notes 125–46. Even the Staub majority recognized this 
possibility and used it to support its textualist interpretation of USERRA. Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 131 
S. Ct. 1186, 1193 (2011). 
 242. See Matrix Capital Mgmt. Fund, L.P. v. BearingPoint, Inc., 576 F.3d 172, 185 (4th Cir. 
2009); In re Alpharma Inc. Sec. Litig., 372 F.3d 137, 141 (3d Cir. 2004). 
 243. Teamsters Local 445 Freight Div. Pension Fund v. Dynex Capital Inc., 531 F.3d 190, 193, 
195 (2d Cir. 2008); In re Wachovia Equity Sec. Litig., 753 F. Supp. 2d 326, 342, 352 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 244. In re Gilead Scis. Sec. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1050–51 (9th Cir. 2008). 
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foreign officials
245—all of which could be recharacterized as “customs” of 
lower level employees who, acting with at least subjective reckless 
disregard of the risk their actions posed, “caused” a false statement by 
filtering false information up through corporate reporting channels (or by 
withholding information the employees had a duty to report). Though 
courts do not necessarily deem such conduct a “custom” in the § 1983 
sense,
246
 they do attempt to determine organizational liability by inquiring 
whether the conduct was so commonplace that the knowledge of senior 
level officers can be inferred, with individual and organizational liability 
to follow.
247
 At the pleading stage, courts have adopted certain rules of 
thumb that allow them to impute knowledge of a custom to senior officers, 
such as drawing the inference that when the problems affect a “core” 
aspect of the business, knowledge of senior officers may be assumed.
248
 
Similarly, where plaintiffs can identify red flags of illicit activity,
249
 or can 
allege that wrongdoing was so widespread as to be common knowledge,
250
 
knowledge of corporate officers may be imputed. Indeed, the similarities 
between the Monell analysis and the section 10(b) analysis can be quite 
striking. For instance, in both Pineda v. City of Houston,
251
 (a custom 
§ 1983 case) and Teamsters Local 445 Freight Division Pension Fund v. 
Dynex Capital Inc.,
252
 (a section 10(b) case), the courts held that 
organizational liability had not been pled because plaintiffs had not shown 
that raw data regarding lower level agent misconduct had ever been 
compiled into easily accessible reports that could be digested by higher 
level authorities. 
But the critical difference is that for section 10(b) claims, courts locate 
mens rea solely in the higher level actors, with the conduct of lower level 
 
 
 245. See Glazer Capital Mgmt., LP v. Magistri, 549 F.3d 736, 741–42 (9th Cir. 2008); In re Faro 
Techs. Sec. Litig., 534 F. Supp. 2d 1248, 1255, 1263 (M.D. Fla. 2007). 
 246. Though they might deem it “pervasive,” In re Providian Fin. Corp. Sec. Litig., 152 F. Supp. 
2d 814, 818 (E.D. Pa. 2001), “routine[],” In re Dynex Capital, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 05 Civ. 1897(HB), 
2009 WL 3380621, *7 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2009), or “an ongoing method of doing business.” Faro 
Techs., 534 F. Supp. 2d at 1263. 
 247. See Providian, 152 F. Supp. 2d at 825 (concluding that “illegal or fraudulent practices 
permeated core aspects of Providian’s business and were so pervasive that [the top officers] must have 
known or were reckless in not knowing”); cf. Alpharma, 372 F.3d at 151 (refusing to infer knowledge 
by top officers because misconduct occurred at a division that contributed one half of one percent of 
company’s revenues). 
 248. See Michael J. Kaufman & John M. Wunderlich, Messy Mental Markers: Inferring Scienter 
from Core Operations in Securities Fraud Litigation, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 507, 517 (2012). 
 249. See In re ArthroCare Corp. Sec. Litig., 726 F. Supp. 2d 696, 711–18 (W.D. Tex. 2010). 
 250. See, e.g., In re Flag Telecom Holdings, Ltd. Sec. Litig., 352 F. Supp. 2d 429, 467 (S.D.N.Y. 
2005).  
 251. 291 F.3d 325, 331 (5th Cir. 2002). 
 252. 531 F.3d 190, 196 (2d Cir. 2008). 
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actors only serving as evidence of the higher level actors’ true state of 
mind.
253
 By contrast, under § 1983, when the constitutional tort requires 
mens rea, courts permit mens rea to be located in the lower level actor, 
with organizational liability imposed when higher level actors behave with 
objective disregard for the lower level behavior. Section 10(b) does not 
draw the distinction that § 1983 does between organizational liability 
based on objective deliberate indifference to the conduct of lower level 
actors, and organizational liability based on actions of higher level actors; 
in the section 10(b) context, only higher level actors have the courts’ 
attention. 
Perhaps because of this narrowed set of options, there is great 
uncertainty as to the precise mens rea that these higher level officials must 
harbor before they (and their companies) may be deemed liable under 
section 10(b). Though there is universal agreement that recklessness, as 
well as intent, is sufficient for liability, there has never been clarity about 
whether recklessness is a subjective or an objective standard.
254
 Courts 
vacillate between describing recklessness as an objective standard of 
conduct, or a subjective disregard of risk by the actor, sometimes 
employing conflicting definitions within a single opinion.
255
 Professor 
Langevoort describes section 10(b) recklessness as a standard of care that 
 
 
 253. See, e.g., Mizzaro v. Home Depot, Inc., 544 F.3d 1230, 1251–54 (11th Cir. 2008) (inquiring 
whether the widespread fraudulent conduct of lower level employees was sufficiently obvious that it 
would have been known to higher level actors). 
 254. See Geoffrey Rapp, Rewiring the DNA of Securities Fraud Litigation: Amgen’s Missed 
Opportunity, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1475, 1486 (2013); William H. Kuehnle, On Scienter, Knowledge, 
and Recklessness Under the Federal Securities Laws, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 121, 187–88 (1997). Several 
scholars have argued that the Supreme Court’s decision in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 
(1976) requires that recklessness be defined subjectively. See Paul S. Milich, Securities Fraud Under 
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5: Scienter, Recklessness and the Good Faith Defense, 11 J. CORP. L. 179, 
180–81 (1986); Kuehnle, supra, at 177–88. 
 255. For example, courts commonly define section 10(b) recklessness as “a form of intent” 
(implying subjective awareness of wrongdoing) but also describe it as “an extreme departure from the 
standards of ordinary care” (implying an objective standard). See, e.g., In re VeriFone Holdings, Inc. 
Sec. Litig., 704 F.3d 694, 702 (9th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted) (employing both 
definitions); SEC v. Shanahan, 646 F.3d 536, 543 (8th Cir. 2011) (same); Frank v. Dana Corp., 646 
F.3d 954, 959 (6th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted) (describing recklessness as “highly 
unreasonable conduct which is an extreme departure from the standards of ordinary care” but also as 
akin to “conscious disregard”). Most definitions of section 10(b) recklessness are traceable to the 
Seventh Circuit’s decision in Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chemical Corp., 553 F.2d 1033 (7th Cir. 1977), 
which claimed, alternately, that recklessness was the “functional equivalent of intent,” “measures 
conduct against an external standard,” and that “[t]his is a subjective test.” Id. at 1045 & n.20; see also 
Milich, supra note 254, at 193–96 (discussing the contradictions in Sundstand); Kuehnle, supra note 
254, at 180–86 (same). In In re NVIDIA Corp. Sec. Litig. 768 F.3d 1046 (9th Cir. 2014), the Ninth 
Circuit went so far as to suggest that recklessness is subjective for purposes of a motion to dismiss, but 
objective for purposes of summary judgment—without explaining how a substantive element of a 
section 10(b) violation can change definitions depending on the stage of litigation. See id. at 1053 n.7. 
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has “an extra element of subjective awareness” that “the speaker knows 
that he does not know the truth, but speaks as if he does.”256 
To be sure, these concepts are often difficult to distinguish; without 
direct access to another person’s thoughts, even “subjective” mental states 
may only be proved by reference to external criteria, which resembles an 
objective inquiry.
257
 Nonetheless, some courts have demonstrated a 
particular hostility to inferring recklessness based on what corporate 
officials “must have known” by virtue of their positions, at least in the 
absence of allegations of specific reports those officials actually received 
about internal conditions.
258
 While some courts are relatively forgiving 
about declaring that certain facts were widespread enough that knowledge 
of top officers should be presumed, other courts direct their inquiries to 
what officials actually did know,
259
 rather than what they should have 
known (let alone what “in the proper exercise of [their] official 
responsibilities,” officers should have known).260 As a result of this 
inconsistency in the doctrine, courts have spent little energy attempting to 
define a standard of ordinary care for corporate executives, which leaves 
them without any consistent tools for determining whether a particular 
misstatement represented a departure from those standards.
261
  
Therefore, the Monell doctrine may have a particular lesson to teach 
courts entertaining section 10(b) claims. For torts that require scienter, 
organizational liability is appropriate if either the higher level officials 
harbor subjective mens rea when “making” false statements, or lower level 
employees harbor the subjective mental state and higher level officials act 
with some kind of fault, such as objective indifference to the risk that the 
lower level employees pose to the integrity of the corporation’s 
statements. In the former case, both the organization and the individual 
 
 
 256. Donald C. Langevoort, “Fine Distinctions” in the Contemporary Law of Insider Trading, 
2013 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 429, 437 (2013). 
 257. See Milich, supra note 254, at 184–86. 
 258. See, e.g., Metzler Inv. GMBH v. Corinthian Colls., Inc., 540 F.3d 1049, 1068 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(“[C]orporate management’s general awareness of the day-to-day workings of the company’s business 
does not establish scienter—at least absent some additional allegation of specific information 
conveyed to management and related to the fraud.”); Bd. of Trs. of Ft. Lauderdale Gen. Emps. Ret. 
Sys. v. Mechel OAO, 811 F. Supp. 2d 853, 873 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); Local No. 38 Int’l Bhd. of Elec. 
Workers Pension Fund v. Am. Express Co., 724 F. Supp. 2d 447, 462 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
 259. See, e.g., Zucco Partners, LLC v. Digimarc Corp., 552 F.3d 981, 998–99 (9th Cir. 2009); In 
re Ceridian Corp. Sec. Litig., 542 F.3d 240, 248 (8th Cir. 2008); Local No. 38, 724 F. Supp. 2d at 461; 
Mechel OAO, 811 F. Supp. 2d at 873. 
 260. Spell v. McDaniel, 824 F.2d 1380, 1387 (4th Cir. 1987).  
 261. See Ann Morales Olazabal, Defining Recklessness: A Doctrinal Approach to Deterrence of 
Secondary Market Securities Fraud, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 1415, 1425 (explaining that courts have not 
gone much further than describing various fact patterns that may be indicative of recklessness). 
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official would be liable under section 10(b), but in the latter case, after 
Janus, only the organization itself would be liable.  
There are sporadic examples of section 10(b) courts employing this sort 
of analysis—relying on the conduct of a behind-the-scenes agent to 
impose organizational liability, but bolstering their reasoning by 
highlighting the widespread nature of the conduct, or the dysfunctional 
nature of the organization as a whole.
262
 Though Monell is widely 
criticized for imposing too high a burden on plaintiffs, comparisons to 
Monell would allow section 10(b) courts to deal in a systematic way with 
at least one common fact pattern. If anything, because section 10(b) 
cases—unlike most § 1983 suits—involve an actus reus that comes from 
top management, rather than lower level actors, it is arguably more 
appropriate in the context of section 10(b) to factor higher level actors in 
the organizational fault analysis. 
A complete analysis of how Monell doctrine might usefully inform 
section 10(b) jurisprudence is beyond the scope of this Article;
263
 however, 
at least some of the virtues are plain. Borrowing from Monell would allow 
courts to formulate objective standards of fault—”deliberate indifference” 
or something similar—to play a similar role in section 10(b) litigation that 
they do in the context of § 1983, i.e., that of a “gap-filler.” Such standards 
would prevent high-level authorities from insulating themselves from 
knowledge of wrongdoing, while still ensuring that section 10(b)’s 
scienter requirement is satisfied by locating it in lower level actors. Even if 
this approach only makes a practical difference on the margin, it focuses 
courts’ attention on institutional wrongdoing without depending entirely 
on the subjective understandings of top officers, which allows for a more 
 
 
 262. See, e.g., In re Sonus Networks, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. Civ. A.04-10294-DPW, 2006 WL 
1308165, at *23 (D. Mass. May 10, 2006) (holding corporation liable for the behind-the-scenes actions 
of a controller because “[a]t a minimum, more senior management than [the controller] recklessly 
failed to have a structure that would insure the dissemination of correct information in an environment 
where [the controller] allegedly encouraged accounting fraud”); In re Faro Techs. Sec. Litig., 534 F. 
Supp. 2d 1248, 1263 (M.D. Fla. 2007) (corporation may be liable partly because of the illegal conduct 
of mid-level officers, but also because the conduct represented “an ongoing method of doing business 
by FARO”). 
 263. Among other things, questions may be raised as to whether section 10(b) liability is 
appropriate in circumstances where no individual actor—whether high- or low-level—harbored the 
relevant scienter. In the § 1983 context, even for constitutional torts that require mens rea, some courts 
permit such liability when institutional policies display objective deliberate indifference to the risk of a 
constitutional violation, and simultaneously prevent individual actors from forming the relevant mens 
rea (by, for example, preventing relevant information from circulating throughout the organization). 
See, e.g., Thomas v. Cook Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 604 F.3d 293, 305 (7th Cir. 2009); cf. Epps v. 
Lauderdale Cnty., 45 Fed. App’x 332, 335 (6th Cir. 2002) (Cole, J., concurring). There may also be 
questions regarding the mechanisms used to prove the existence of scienter among, potentially, many 
lower level employees whose combined actions cause the corporation to issue false statements.  
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nuanced, and more accurate, notion of corporate “fault.” Otherwise, 
especially given the increasingly narrow set of persons who may be held 
personally liable for section 10(b) violations, corporations will have every 
incentive to encourage misconduct by lower level actors, and lower level 
actors will have little reason to resist that encouragement.  
Moreover, though there have been several challenges to the concept of 
entity liability in section 10(b) cases at all,
264
 where lower level actors 
harbored subjective scienter, the value of entity-level liability is plain: 
lower level actors are likely to be judgment-proof and, in many cases, will 
have acted en masse; lawsuits against them individually would present an 
impossible task. Entity-level liability would certainly have at least some 
deterrent effect, by, among other things, encouraging corporate actors to 
develop the types of internal systems required to identify lower level 
wrongdoing.
265
 And to the extent that courts are seeking a mechanism for 
identifying organizational “fault” to match the seriousness of a 
section 10(b) lawsuit, the case for entity liability is strongest under 
precisely these conditions, namely, when no individual actor can be held 
liable, or when the only individuals responsible are too low-level to bear 
the moral weight of the offense.
266
 If federal disclosure requirements have 
taken on a moral dimension—policing corporations as public actors—that 
section 10(b) enforces, it is particularly appropriate for liability to be 
imposed based on such widespread misconduct.
267
  
Another advantage to this approach is that it allows courts to make use 
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (“SOX”) to determine what sorts of knowledge 
to impute to management. Under SOX and its implementing regulations, 
the CEO and CFO have a nondelegable duty to design, periodically 
evaluate, and publicly report on the effectiveness of corporate internal 
controls.
268
 These systems must (1) ensure that all “material information 
 
 
 264. Many scholars have argued that whatever deterrent effect section 10(b) liability has, it would 
be improved if there were a greater focus on the wrongdoing of individual executives. See, e.g., Arlen 
& Carney, supra note 16, at 734; Cox, supra note 11, at 40; Langevoort, supra 15, at 655–56.  
 265. See, e.g., Steven P. Croley, Vicarious Liability in Tort: On the Sources and Limits of 
Employee Reasonableness, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1705, 1733–37 (1996); see also Jennings et al., supra 
note 135; Brian C. McTier & John K. Wald, The Causes and Consequences of Securities Class Action 
Litigation, 17 J. CORP. FIN. 649, 663 (2011). The Sarbanes-Oxley Act, in fact, requires just such 
systems, as discussed below; a “custom” based liability as described here would therefore 
appropriately help to both enforce, and develop, the law regarding these requirements.  
 266. Gerard E. Lynch, The Role of Criminal Law in Policing Corporate Misconduct, L. & 
CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1997, at 23, 51 (1997); see also Gabaldon, supra, note 25, at 238–40 
(recognizing that entity liability—civil or criminal—is particularly appropriate in situations where 
there is no single individual who can be held accountable). 
 267. See supra Part II.C.3. 
 268. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.307, 229.308, 229.601, 240.13a-15 (2014). 
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relating to” the company and its consolidated subsidiaries, including all 
information that the company is required to disclose to investors, “is 
accumulated and communicated to the issuer’s management,” including 
the CEO and CFO; and (2) “provide reasonable assurance regarding the 
reliability of financial reporting.”269 Through these rules, SOX “imposed 
an obligation of oversight and monitoring on top corporate officers.”270 
Courts have generally refused to rely on internal control certifications 
to impute mens rea to corporate management,
271
 presumably because all 
public corporations are subject to the certification requirements, and 
therefore certification alone provides no basis for distinguishing fraud 
from negligence. Nonetheless, SOX certification can serve as guidance for 
courts to help them define the appropriate standard of care for corporate 
executives—what, in other words, “in the proper exercise of their official 
responsibilities,” officers should have known. This will will then allow 
courts to gauge whether those officers’ failure to know of lower level 
misconduct represents the kind of extreme departure from those standards 
that constitutes “objective” recklessness/deliberate indifference.272 Courts 
could also take into account the responsibilities of independent directors to 
monitor the accuracy of corporate communications—another obligation 
imposed by the securities laws, but rarely subject to judicial 
enforcement.
273
 Thus, the use of a Monell-like standard could not only 
bring clarity to section 10(b) in general, but also could provide an 
opportunity for courts to give much-needed content to the broad 
monitoring mandates imposed by the securities laws. Or, to put it another 
way, in situations where lower level actors behaved with subjective 
 
 
 269. 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.601, 240.13a-15 (2014). 
 270. Olazabal, supra note 261, at 1454. 
 271. See, e.g., Garfield v. NDC Health Corp., 466 F.3d 1255, 1266 (11th Cir. 2006). 
 272. Professor Morales Olazabal similarly proposes, in line with the spirit of the SOX certification 
requirements, that courts adopt a presumption that management was aware of problems or misconduct 
within the firm that reach a certain threshold of size, importance, and unusualness. She does not, 
however, recommend that this presumption extend beyond the pleading stage of a securities case, out 
of fear that the results would be too “draconian.” See Olazabal, supra note 261, at 1455; see also 
Kaufman & Wunderlich, supra note 248, at 534 (arguing that, at the pleading stage, courts should infer 
that management acted with scienter when they speak falsely about the company’s “core operations”). 
The custom standards proposed here are different: they extend beyond the pleading stage, but are 
limited to organizational (rather than personal) liability. Moreover, as described in this Part, they are 
only relevant in the specific context where lower level agents acted with the relevant scienter for a 
section 10(b) violation, namely, a subjective intent, or reckless indifference, to the potential for 
misleading investors. 
 273. Hillary A. Sale, Independent Directors as Securities Monitors, 61 BUS. LAW. 1375, 1382–88 
(2006). Some case law has been generated under section 11, which imposes liability for false 
statements in a registration statement subject to a due diligence defense, but it is extremely 
underdeveloped. See id. at 1394.  
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recklessness, courts need not determine what the highest management did 
know in order to impose liability on the organization. Instead, courts might 
ask whether, given management’s assurances that they have met federal 
obligations to ensure that they are notified of material matters, they should 
have known, had they acted with basic regard for their responsibilities.  
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, liability under these conditions 
would appropriately set minimal standards for corporate behavior that are 
in keeping with the modern role that securities lawsuits play in setting 
corporate governance standards. It is entirely consonant with the modern 
statutory scheme to define organizational fraud broadly enough to 
encompass materially false statements that are caused by the objectively 
unreasonable indifference of high level corporate officials to the 
widespread reckless conduct of lower level employees. Even though 
corporate officials may only be mismanaging the company by permitting 
such conduct, this behavior—a blind eye turned by corporate managers to 
reckless conduct within the company that has a direct effect on public 
reporting—is precisely what SOX and Dodd-Frank were intended to 
curb.
274
 Officials’ failure to control their employees falls so far outside of 
the basic duties that federal law requires of corporate managers that 
accountability via section 10(b) is appropriate.  
To be sure, this approach does not completely resolve the problem of 
defining scienter that emanates from lower level misconduct that is not 
directed specifically toward corporate bookkeeping. Nonetheless, courts 
will at least have a framework for analysis—did the lower level agents act 
with reckless disregard as to whether their conduct would cause the 
corporation to issue false statements?—with the “cushion” of higher level 
wrongdoing to assuage any fears of casting too wide a net of liability. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has demonstrated that rules that courts have used to hold 
organizations liable for section 10(b) violations in open-market cases 
differ from agency principles as they are applied in other areas of law. In 
fact, when it comes to open-market section 10(b) claims, courts appear 
uncomfortable with the “strict” aspects of vicarious liability, and prefer to 
identify organizational “fault,” typically defined to mean endorsement of 
the fraud at the corporation’s highest levels. Courts’ reasons for eschewing 
vicarious liability principles in this context are likely based on a series of 
 
 
 274. Hillary A. Sale, The New “Public” Corporation, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 2011, at 
137 (2011); Langevoort, supra note 131, at 1829. 
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policy concerns rooted in the changing nature of the section 10(b) action. 
Of these, the most important is likely the fear that the deterrence function 
of section 10(b) is no longer aimed exclusively at policing securities fraud, 
but also now captures matters more traditionally addressed under state 
corporate governance standards and even other federal statutes designed to 
substantively control corporate misconduct. Courts limit the use of 
vicarious liability in order to prevent section 10(b) from becoming a 
“super” statute that is used to punish corporations for any kind of 
antisocial behavior. 
Similar concerns have animated the approach courts have taken in 
determining organizational liability under § 1983. Perhaps most strikingly, 
in the § 1983 context, just as in the section 10(b) context, courts appear to 
be limiting vicarious liability as a mechanism for distinguishing matters of 
federal concern—constitutional torts—from ordinary torts that are more 
appropriately dealt with under state law.  
For this reason, the doctrines that have been developed under § 1983 
can help guide courts in the section 10(b) context. This is particularly so 
with respect to the concept of organizational “deliberate indifference” to 
lower level misconduct, a notion that prevents higher level municipal 
authorities from avoiding liability by insulating themselves from 
knowledge of the conduct of lower level actors. Because section 10(b) 
organizational liability is currently skewed toward the knowledge and 
conduct of high-level officers, some sort of gap-filler is necessary to 
prevent a similar evasion; § 1983 may therefore point the way forward. 
Perhaps the most important implication of this analysis, however, is 
that if the nature of the section 10(b) action changes again, courts should 
revisit their approach to determining organizational mens rea. Section 
10(b)’s deterrence function, and its role in enforcing the federal 
disclosure-based corporate governance standards, is directly traceable to 
the adoption of the fraud-on-the-market doctrine. But that doctrine has 
been controversial from its inception, and there are perpetual proposals to 
either pare it back or eliminate it entirely. The Supreme Court’s recent 
decision in Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc.,
275
 for example, 
left the doctrine intact but may make it more difficult for plaintiffs to win 
class certification. Because only a small number of investors are likely to 
have personally relied on any particular false statement, if fraud-on-the-
market theory is narrowed, the number of potential plaintiffs in any given 
case will be dramatically reduced. Many of those potential plaintiffs will 
 
 
 275. 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2417 (2014). 
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not have losses large enough to justify the risk and expense of a securities 
lawsuit; thus, section 10(b) claims based on open-market frauds will 
become much rarer, and seek smaller damages.  
If this occurs, it is unlikely that section 10(b) will continue to serve a 
significant deterrent function, while at the same time, those lawsuits that 
are brought are much more likely to result in significant compensation to 
the few investors who bring them (at minimum, they are likely to do a 
better job at compensating investors than their class action predecessors). 
The persons who bring such suits—who can demonstrate that they 
personally relied on the corporate misstatements—may also have a greater 
claim to compensation than other traders, because they are less likely to be 
diversified, and more likely to contribute to market efficiency with their 
trading behavior.
276
 Under such circumstances, section 10(b) may once 
again become a garden-variety tort statute, and many of the concerns that 
have apparently motivated courts to limit the application of vicarious 
liability will no longer be relevant. Thus, if fraud-on-the-market liability is 
eliminated, courts should become more willing to allow lower level actors’ 
scienter to be imputed to the organization, in accord with ordinary agency 
principles.  
More radically, the best solution may simply be to develop different 
standards for organizational liability within and without the fraud-on-the-
market context. Scholars have argued that fraud on the market is so 
distinct from its predecessor tort of deceit that it should be considered its 
own separate type of tort;
277
 as this Article demonstrates, class action suits 
brought via the fraud-on-the-market doctrine serve a fundamentally 
different purpose than individual suits brought based on an individual 
investor’s reliance on a particular false statement. Therefore, it may be 
appropriate only to impose Monell-style corporate liability when investors 
claim market reliance, while restoring vicarious liability principles for 
lawsuits based on actual reliance.
278
 Indeed, we may see precisely this 
situation in the after math of the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act 
(JOBS Act),
279
 which, among other things, makes it easier for smaller 
companies to raise capital in small offerings, but these smaller offerings 
are unlikely to qualify for application of the fraud-on-the-market doctrine. 
 
 
 276. See Fisch, supra note 16, at 348; Bratton & Wachter, supra note 10, at 102. 
 277. Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 107, at 1799. 
 278. It has previously been proposed that fraud-on-the-market damages should differ from 
damages incurred by actual reliance on false statements. See A. C. Pritchard, Stoneridge Investment 
Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta: The Political Economy of Securities Class Action Reform, 2007–08 
CATO SUP. CT. REV. 217, 237–38. 
 279. Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012). 
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Any section 10(b) claims brought against companies taking advantage of 
the JOBS Act will thus likely be based on actual reliance, where the case 
for ordinary vicarious liability is stronger. 
Ultimately, however, the courts’ dilemma in this regard can be traced 
back to the fact that both Congress and the SEC increasingly use federal 
disclosure requirements as a mechanism for substantive regulation of 
corporate behavior, to be enforced by the threat of section 10(b) liability. 
These new requirements often appear to be more of a compromise to avoid 
mandating particular standards of conduct than they do a judgment about 
the propriety of disclosure as a governance mechanism per se.
280
 It is 
precisely because Congress and the SEC are insufficiently committed to 
fully regulating corporate behavior that courts are forced into the awkward 
position of attempting to use agency law to delineate the proper contours 
of section 10(b) claims. The solution is for Congress and the SEC to 
decide what role the federal government has, or should have, with respect 
to imposing substantive standards of behavior on corporations, and to 
further decide what role section 10(b) should play in policing those 
standards. Until then, courts will increasingly feel the need to develop 
their own ad hoc rules on the subject, which may or may not accord with 
federal policy, either by imposing liability too broadly or—as seems more 
likely—increasingly focusing on a narrow set of high-level actors, even 
when corporate behavior strays very far from the standards that federal 
law has imposed. 
 
 
 280. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1 (2012) (“say on pay” statute requiring disclosure of CEO 
compensation and nonbinding shareholder approval); 17 C.F.R. § 229.407(c)(2)(vi) (2014) (requiring 
disclosure of diversity considerations when board members are selected). 
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